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PRACTICES ACT: THE DYNAMIC 
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT 
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ABSTRACT 
  Corporations that have allegedly violated the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) increasingly face a new threat of liability: cases 
brought by private plaintiffs in follow-on derivative suits. These 
derivative suits for breaches of fiduciary duty focus on whether 
directors provided the necessary oversight through compliance 
systems designed to detect and prevent FCPA violations. The demand 
requirement, a procedural hurdle of derivative suits, has stymied 
plaintiffs that are unable to show that directors cannot disinterestedly 
assess whether to pursue a claim for violations. This Note proposes a 
framework that systematizes the factual scenarios under which the 
demand requirement could be excused. Using other instances of 
regulatory violations as a lens, courts can infer that directors knew of 
FCPA violations based on patterns of bribes and the importance of 
bribery to the overall business of the corporation. Only plaintiffs that 
have utilized procedural devices to inspect corporate books and 
records, however, can expect courts to reach this inference of director 
knowledge. Despite being much maligned, the follow-on derivative 
suit may actually clarify the duties of directors in FCPA compliance 
and advance the corporate governance reforms of corporations, 
separately from the deterrent effect of government enforcement. 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 21, 2012, a New York Times article reported a failed 
investigation into Wal-Mart’s business-driven bribery practices 
worldwide.1 The incident that prompted the investigation began in 
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Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at A1. 
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2005, when a former executive at Wal-Mart de Mexico (Wal-Mex), 
Wal-Mart’s largest foreign subsidiary, alerted Wal-Mart that Wal-
Mex had systematically bribed government officials to facilitate 
expansion across Mexico.2 The article detailed a carefully organized 
system in which bribes were paid through middlemen and concealed 
on invoices using secret-code numbers denoting the purpose of each 
bribe.3 Wal-Mart’s investigative unit discovered payments totaling 
more than $24 million and recommended a full investigation into 
possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).4 
The article claimed that instead “Wal-Mart’s leaders shut [the 
investigation] down.”5 Concerned that the details about the bribes 
would reach the public, Wal-Mart’s board of directors decided on a 
new course of action: the Wal-Mex general counsel would head the 
investigation, effectively giving responsibility to uncover wrongdoing 
to those under suspicion.6 
Once Wal-Mart’s bribery scandal made headlines, the California 
State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS), concerned that Wal-
Mart’s bribery practices and the corresponding potential for hefty 
penalties would negatively impact its substantial holdings in Wal-
Mart, filed a shareholder derivative suit against Wal-Mart’s board in 
the Delaware Court of Chancery.7 CalSTRS used the New York 
Times article to support allegations that three directors had “direct 
contemporaneous knowledge of the bribery allegations” based on 
internal communications regarding the preliminary internal 
investigation.8 The plaintiffs also alleged that the rest of the board 
“would have been informed of the adverse findings,” pursuant to 
Wal-Mart’s corporate governance guidelines.9 CalSTRS claimed the 
board breached its fiduciary duties by refusing to conduct a full and 
independent investigation despite (1) whistleblower evidence that 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012); see Barstow, 
supra note 1. 
 5. Barstow, supra note 1. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 
No. 7490, at 24 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2012), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/news/
business/walmart-shareholder-complaint.pdf. 
 8. Id. at 28–29. 
 9. Id. at 29. 
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Wal-Mex paid bribes to foreign officials and (2) the investigative 
report’s finding that Wal-Mex violated anti-bribery laws.10 
The suit was derivative in that injury belonged to the 
corporation, not the shareholders themselves. A derivative plaintiff 
like CalSTRS must satisfy Delaware’s demand requirement. The 
demand requirement obligates a plaintiff, before filing suit, to ask the 
board to bring a suit on behalf of the corporation.11 Alternatively, a 
plaintiff can allege demand futility and ask the court to excuse the 
demand requirement by showing that demand would be useless 
because the board would be unable to consider the best interests of 
the corporation in deciding whether to bring a case.12 CalSTRS sought 
to overcome the demand requirement by pleading demand futility 
because the directors, having already ignored the need for an 
investigation, were now “incapable of impartially investigating or 
taking appropriate action against themselves and others.”13 In fact, 
multiple shareholder derivative suits against Wal-Mart make similar 
allegations and are still in pretrial stages at the time of publication: 
seven in Delaware and five in Arkansas state and federal court.14 
Academics and practitioners now recognize the likelihood that 
litigation, similar to CalSTRS’s derivative suit, will follow allegations 
 
 10. Id. at 2, 3. 
 11. In shareholder derivative suits, the derivative plaintiff is asserting injury on behalf of 
the corporation and is therefore required to demand that the board address this injury. See DEL. 
CH. CT. R. 23.1(a) (“The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made 
by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable 
authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the 
effort.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3) (requiring particularized pleading like Delaware).  
 12. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (“[W]here officers and directors 
are under an influence which sterilizes their discretion, they cannot be considered proper 
persons to conduct litigation on behalf of the corporation.”), overruled in part on other grounds 
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 13. Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 7, at 29. Instead, the complaint 
alleged that the directors allowed those accused of wrongdoing or their subordinates to head 
investigations and “maintain[ed] a wholly inadequate corporate investigations unit.” Id. at 32. 
 14. See Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement as Seen Through Wal-
Mart’s Potential Exposure, WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP., Sept. 21, 2012, at 1, 7 (“[A]t least 12 
shareholder lawsuits have been filed against Wal-Mart and/or its officers and directors in the 
wake of the Times article.”). See generally In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 
No. 4:12-cv-4041, 2012 WL 5935340, at *1 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 27, 2012) (consolidating state and 
federal suits against Wal-Mart and ordering a stay of proceedings in Arkansas as consolidated 
suits moved forward in the Delaware Court of Chancery). Although the suits are still in early 
stages, the extent of alleged wrongdoing at Wal-Mart indicates widespread failings of the 
corporate compliance system. See Stephanie Clifford & David Barstow, Wal-Mart Takes a 
Broader Look at Bribery Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A1 (noting that Wal-Mart’s 
bribery practices extended to other large country markets, including Brazil, China, and India). 
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of FCPA violations.15 However, these follow-on derivative suits16 have 
been criticized as an ineffective means of enforcing director 
obligations,17 because they are subject to heightened pleading 
requirements.18 Moreover, commentators attribute little value to 
follow-on derivative suits, arguing that such suits are only financially 
motivated by attorneys’ fees and carry little legal substance.19 
By contrast, this Note posits that follow-on derivative suits do 
possess value in that they provide an opportunity to develop a 
 
 15. E.g., Koehler, supra note 14, at 6–7; see George H. Brown, Debra Wong Yang & 
Matthew S. Kahn, Strategies for Mitigating Civil Liability Consequences of FCPA Investigations 
& Enforcement Actions, SEC. LITIG. REP., Apr. 2012 (reprint at 1), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/BrownYangKahn-StrategiesforMitigating
CivilLiabilityConsequences%20(2).pdf (“[F]ollow-on litigation [has] become virtually a 
guaranteed by-product of an internal or government FCPA investigation.”); Jason E. Prince, A 
Rose by Any Other Name? Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-Inspired Civil Actions, THE 
ADVOCATE, Mar./Apr. 2009, at 20, 22–23 (acknowledging a possible surge in shareholder 
actions after a class of shareholders received a large securities settlement); see also 2012 Mid-
Year FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN 13–16 (July 9, 2012), http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/Documents/2012MidYearFCPAUpdate.pdf (noting that “the continued stream of 
FCPA-inspired” litigation and the development of “several new fronts in this landscape”). 
 16. This Note refers to shareholder derivative suits that allege breaches of fiduciary duty 
arising from alleged violations of the FCPA as follow-on derivative suits.  
 17. Donald A. Corbett & Daniel K. Roque, The Next Wave of FCPA Shareholder 
Derivative Actions, 42 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 855, 858 (2010); Gideon Mark, Private FCPA 
Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419, 446–47, 459–86 (2012) (indicating that collateral litigation 
will likely increase, but arguing that the different forms of collateral litigation are not viable and 
thus, a private right of action under the FCPA is necessary); Ann Deen Westbrook, Double 
Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Investigation, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1224–26, 1252 (2012) (casting the FCPA-related 
shareholder derivative suit as a phenomenon arising from the lack of a private cause of action 
and arguing that federal securities actions serve as better vehicles in private litigation).  
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. FCPA investigations and derivative suits have been widely covered by specialized 
blogs. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, A Purpose or Parasitic?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-purpose-or-parasitic (noting that, only in the “rare” event 
directors have encouraged an FCPA violation, a derivative suit would be justified); Mike 
Koehler, Nice Pay Day, but What Did You Accomplish?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/nice-pay-day-but-what-did-you-accomplish (arguing that 
companies will settle with plaintiffs “for what amounts to nuisance value” and that plaintiffs 
actually do not accomplish anything, except a pay day); Kevin LaCroix, Faltering Lawsuits: 
Dismissal Motions Hit FCPA Follow-On Civil Actions and Say-on-Pay Suits, D&O DIARY (July 
30, 2012), http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/07/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/faltering -
lawsuits-dismissal-motions-hit-fcpa-followon-civil-actions-and-sayonpay-suits (noting the 
lawsuits that have failed to make it past pleading stages and that “[i]f nothing else, these cases 
show that claimants eager to pursue shareholder derivative suits following on FCPA 
investigations cannot dispense with the procedural prerequisites”); see also Brown et al., supra 
note 15 (reprint at 1) (noting that private parties have “devised many creative ways to ride into 
court on the coattails of an alleged FCPA violation” and that some of these plaintiffs have 
achieved significant monetary, though not legal, success). 
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coherent body of law regarding the obligations of directors of 
corporations that have allegedly violated positive law. Regardless of 
whether demand is excused or the case settles or is dismissed, the 
FCPA follow-on derivative suit serves an important purpose in 
improving corporate compliance with the FCPA’s provisions. In some 
cases, for example, director behavior may be egregious enough to 
infer knowledge and impose liability for breach of fiduciary duties. 
Weaker cases involving decentralized management, however, are 
unlikely to allege demand futility required for a derivative suit to 
withstand dismissal, but plaintiffs may still influence director behavior 
by negotiating settlements that include specific corporate governance 
reforms that reduce the risk of future FCPA violations. 
The liability underlying an FCPA follow-on derivative suit is 
premised on a Caremark20 claim. Plaintiffs alleging a Caremark claim 
assert that directors breached their oversight duties to the 
corporation.21 Although Caremark claims are difficult to win,22 this 
Note offers a framework for understanding cases in which plaintiffs 
have successfully pled demand futility based on violations of positive 
law. The presented typology carves out a subset of cases and factual 
scenarios worthy of shareholder scrutiny into whether directors knew 
about possible violations and fulfilled their oversight duties. In 
follow-on derivative suits, courts have hesitated to infer directors’ 
knowledge of FCPA violations; however, inferring knowledge may be 
reasonable when directors participate in direct control of defective 
compliance programs that led to violations of federal law. 
Furthermore, this Note acknowledges the practical challenges of 
shareholder derivative suits and sets FCPA follow-on derivative suits 
within the context of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s recent 
encouragement to plaintiffs to use procedural devices to support their 
pleadings. 
This Note opens in Part I with background on the FCPA and 
government enforcement. Part II focuses on the pleading burdens of 
Caremark cases and details how the demand-futility requirement has 
 
 20. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 21. 4 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 
535–39 (Stephen A. Radin ed., 6th ed. 2009). 
 22. See e.g., Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (“The theory here advanced is possibly the most 
difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”); 
Claire A. Hill & Brett McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1777 (2007) (“Caremark duties are deliberately structured to make it 
extremely hard for plaintiffs to win.”). 
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been applied in FCPA follow-on derivative cases.23 Part III introduces 
a series of cases in which corporations violated positive law—namely 
off-label advertising and Medicare/Medicaid federal regulations—and 
plaintiffs successfully pled demand futility. These examples urge a 
new approach to the elusive Caremark obligations of directors, 
specifically as they relate to obligations to oversee FCPA-compliance 
systems. In addition to explaining how courts have misapplied case 
law on the failure to monitor and the breach of good-faith and loyalty 
duties in FCPA cases, the discussion of Caremark’s progeny sets the 
stage for a more flexible approach to inferring director knowledge of 
violations. Part IV elucidates the value of FCPA derivative follow-on 
suits in influencing corporate behavior and encouraging compliance 
systems even when plaintiffs unsuccessfully plead demand futility and 
negotiate a settlement. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING THE FCPA 
The FCPA is a major source of potential liability for 
corporations with widespread global operations.24 The Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have 
criminal and civil enforcement authority, respectively, over violations 
by public companies; the DOJ also has criminal and civil enforcement 
authority over FCPA violations by domestic concerns.25 Part of the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act),26 the FCPA applies to 
 
 23. This Note focuses on Delaware corporate law because the majority of corporations are 
incorporated in Delaware, and even if corporations are incorporated elsewhere, many states 
follow Delaware’s demand-futility analysis. See infra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.  
 24. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its 
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 396 (2010) (“But with the increase of 
globalization . . . it is no longer just large resource extraction companies doing business in 
overseas markets that need to be concerned with the FCPA.”); Carl Pacini, The Foreign Corrupt 
Practice Act: Taking a Bite out of Bribery in International Business Transactions, 17 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 545, 560–61 (2012) (explaining how the FCPA reaches foreign subsidiaries 
and joint ventures); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: Minefield for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145, 147–49 (underscoring the need 
for companies to be aware of FCPA risks even if not currently operating in a major BRIC 
market because of the “potential for corporate catastrophe”). 
 25. Mark, supra note 17, at 426–27; see CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A 
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4–5 (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf (explaining the SEC and DOJ’s 
enforcement authority over issuers (public companies) and the DOJ’s authority over domestic 
concerns (non-issuers) which includes American citizens, nationals, residents, businesses, and 
foreign persons or businesses that commit an FCPA violation while in the United States). 
 26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012). 
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all issuers of securities registered with the SEC and companies subject 
to the Exchange Act’s reporting requirements.27 
There are two main grounds for liability under the FCPA. First, 
anti-bribery provisions make it illegal to offer, promise, authorize, or 
make a payment of money or anything of value to a foreign official in 
exchange for obtaining or retaining business.28 Second, provisions on 
recordkeeping and internal controls29 require Exchange Act issuers to 
file reports that provide “reasonable detail” of transactions and 
assets.30 A corporation that offered bribes and then mischaracterized 
the bribes as proper business expenses runs the risk of both criminal 
and civil liability.31 Issuers must also devise an internal auditing 
control system “sufficient to provide reasonable assurances” that 
transactions meet the compliance requirements set by management.32 
Violations of the accounting provisions are actionable in civil 
proceedings but only constitute a criminal offense when a person 
knowingly violates or fails to implement internal controls.33 
The last several years have marked the busiest years for FCPA 
enforcement since the law was enacted in 1977.34 In 2010 and 2011, the 
DOJ and SEC initiated a combined total of 122 proceedings35—more 
than any previous year.36 In 2012, the number of enforcement 
proceedings declined,37 but the number of open investigations, both 
 
 27. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2012) (defining “issuer” for purposes of the FCPA). 
 28. Id. § 78dd-1(a). 
 29. Id. §§ 78m(a)–(b). These accounting provisions constituted a major expansion of SEC 
powers. See SEC v. World-Wide Coin. Invest., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 746–47 (N.D. Ga. 1983) 
(noting that the accounting provisions of the FCPA extend SEC authority over the financial 
management and accounting of corporations “beyond the traditional ambit of disclosure 
requirements”).  
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).  
 31. See CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 39 (“[I]t is never 
appropriate to mischaracterize transactions in a company’s books and records.”). 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
 33. Id. § 78m(b)(4), (5); see Koehler, supra note 24, at 396.  
 34. See, e.g., John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an 
Expanding FCPA, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 25, 26 (2012) (noting that FCPA 
prosecutions have “skyrocketed” and huge “penalties or fines [have] been the routine, almost 
commonplace result”); Corbett & Roque, supra note 17, at 855 (arguing that “renewed 
enforcement” of the FCPA has triggered the emergence of collateral civil litigation related to 
bribery). 
 35. 2012 Mid-Year FCPA Update, supra note 15, at 2. 
 36. See Mark, supra note 17, at 431 (underscoring the stark contrast in enforcement in 2010 
and 2011 as compared to 2004, when only five actions were initiated). 
 37. 2013 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN 2 (July 8, 2013), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Mid-Year-FCPA-Update.pdf 
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criminal and civil, remained high at about 150 DOJ and 80 SEC 
investigations.38 
The pace and scale of recent FCPA-enforcement activity is due 
to efficient enforcement methods.39 The government may resolve 
investigations without undertaking full prosecutions. Rather, the DOJ 
utilizes deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-
prosecution agreements (NPAs) to resolve cases of bribery, 
accounting misconduct, and money laundering related to FCPA 
violations.40 Under these agreements, the DOJ need not expend 
resources to satisfy the burden of proof in a criminal prosecution,41 
and a corporation avoids a criminal indictment but remains liable for 
fines, disgorgement of profits, prejudgment interest, and may be 
obligated to undertake corporate reforms.42 Corporations are 
motivated to disclose FCPA violations to avoid indictment43 and to 
receive leniency in the assessment of penalties.44  
In response to the successful efforts of the DOJ and SEC, robust 
academic discussion and critique have developed, with many 
 
(explaining that in 2010 and 2011, respectively, there were seventy-four and forty-eight DOJ 
and SEC actions combined, but that in 2012, there were only twenty-three). By the middle of 
2013, sixteen new cases had been initiated, id., indicating a “return to the robust levels of recent 
years” after the “relative downtick” in 2012, id. at 1.  
 38. Mark, supra note 17, at 432. 
 39. See Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a 
New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 104 (2011) (explaining the stark contrast between the $1.8 
billion in fines in 2010 and the single enforcement action in 2000 for a $300,000 fine as resulting 
from “a remarkable transformation . . . [in] FCPA enforcement and theories of prosecution”). 
 40. WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY IN INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES 11, 32 (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/anti-briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf. 
 41. Koehler, supra note 39, at 129.  
 42. See Mark, supra note 17, at 431–34 (detailing the use of different enforcement methods 
by the DOJ and SEC in specific cases). 
 43. See id. at 430–31 (noting that up to 60 percent of government enforcement actions are a 
result of voluntary corporate disclosures). 
 44. See Sarah Marberg, Note, Promises of Leniency: Whether Companies Should Self-
Disclose Violations of the FCPA, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 557, 574–77 (2012) (suggesting 
widespread skepticism that the DOJ actually credits companies that voluntarily disclose despite 
DOJ attempts to incentivize cooperation both officially and unofficially). A corporation that 
refuses to disclose voluntarily runs the risk of higher penalties, but may also be subject to 
private liability under securities-fraud regulations. See RAYMOND WONG & PATRICK CONROY, 
NERA ECON. CONSULTING, FCPA SETTLEMENTS: IT’S A SMALL WORLD AFTER ALL 5 ex.1, 
7–9 (2009), available at http://www.nera.com/extImage/Pub_FCPA_Settlements_0109_Final2
.pdf (detailing cases brought against corporations for nondisclosure under Securities Rule 10b-5, 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013), and tracking market capitalization losses as a result of publicized 
FCPA violations). 
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commentators focusing on the shortcomings of government 
enforcement.45 For example, because almost all enforcement actions 
are resolved with DPAs, corporations face an uncertain landscape of 
liability without the benefit of judicial interpretation.46 Instead, FCPA 
liability is “improperly developing through the terms and conditions 
of DPAs, rather than by jury verdicts and appellate court decisions.”47 
Recently released government implementation guidelines clarify 
FCPA requirements for corporations.48 The guidelines identify the 
factors the government considers in evaluating existing compliance 
efforts.49 However, they do not explicitly delineate the responsibilities 
for a director or an officer of a corporation beyond vague 
admonitions to remain committed to a “culture of compliance” and to 
carry out the compliance system in “good faith.”50 Judicial 
interpretation of FCPA liability would facilitate compliance efforts by 
unpacking these substantive responsibilities of directors that, as the 
examples above demonstrate, are not self-defining. In follow-on 
derivative suits, judicial interpretation of director liability after an 
 
 45. See generally Ashcroft & Ratcliffe, supra note 34; Lauren Giudice, Note, Regulating 
Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Current Foreign Corrupt Practice Act Enforcement, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 347 (2011); Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
907 (2010); Pacini, supra note 24; Cortney C. Thomas, Note, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A 
Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439 (2010). 
Commentators focusing on reforms to the FCPA have primarily advocated for leniency reforms, 
such as an amendment that incorporates a good-faith compliance defense. E.g. Mike Koehler, 
Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practice Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 617, 654 
(2012); Michael B. Mukasey & James C. Dunlop, Can Someone Please Turn on the Lights? 
Bringing Transparency to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, ENGAGE, Mar. 2012, at 30, 49; cf. 
Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of Justice 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 213–23 (2010) 
(arguing for a leniency policy modeled after antitrust policies in light of the large-scale 
cooperation of corporations under investigation for FCPA violations). 
 46. See Ashcroft & Ratcliffe, supra note 34, at 34 (noting that terms like “foreign official” 
and “bribe,” after more than thirty-four years, remain “undefined”). 
 47. Id. at 33. Only one corporation has been tried and convicted of FCPA violations. Mark, 
supra note 17, at 443. That conviction was subsequently vacated. United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. 
Supp. 2d 1180, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 48. See, e.g., CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 24–26 (explaining 
which types of payments constitute illegal expenditures and when the FCPA exemption for 
facilitation payments applies).  
 49. See id. at 53 (listing the “pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including 
the complicity in, or the condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate management” as one of the 
factors, among many others, informing the decision to investigate possible violations).  
 50. Id. at 57 (quoting Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC 
Implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley: The New Corporate Governance, Remarks at National 
Economists Club (April 7, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch040703cag.htm)). 
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FCPA violation would provide important jurisprudential data points 
for corporate directors and officers overseeing compliance systems. 
Responses to FCPA violations indicate that corporations are 
well-served by looking beyond the government action to the 
downstream private collateral litigation that follows.51 Company 
securities disclosures or news of a settlement between a corporation 
and the DOJ or SEC often trigger private actions.52 Most 
commentators expect this trend to continue.53 The absence of a 
private cause of action under the FCPA itself54 means that private 
actors have resorted to other legal avenues to bring claims arising 
from an alleged FCPA violation—the shareholder derivative suit 
among them. 
II.  HURDLES TO ALLEGING DEMAND FUTILITY 
This Part explains the main procedural requirement in 
shareholder derivative suits: demand on the board, or alternatively, 
demand futility. First, this Part lays out seminal Delaware case law 
that guides the analysis of when demand is futile. It then argues that 
courts outside of Delaware have misapplied demand futility in FCPA 
follow-on derivative suits. Second, this Part addresses the intersection 
of demand with pleading the directors’ failure to monitor and 
underscores how the analyses at the procedural stages of demand and 
pleading require an inquiry into substantive law of director and 
officer obligations. 
 
 51. See Jeffrey S. Johnston & Erika Tristán, The Next FCPA Battleground: Private Civil 
Lawsuits Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Settlements with U.S. Government Authorities, 
LITIG. NEWS (Vinson & Elkins, Houston, Tex.), Winter 2011, at 1–4, available at 
http://www.velaw.com/uploadedFiles/VEsite/Resources/VELitigationNewsWinter2011.pdf 
(noting that even after corporations settle with the government, private parties employ a variety 
of legal measures, including civil RICO claims and securities fraud actions, against 
corporations).  
 52. Id. at 2.  
 53. See Corbett & Roque, supra note 17, at 855 (“[The FCPA enforcement] spike will 
undoubtedly result in an increase in parallel civil litigation.”); Mark, supra note 17, at 447 (“The 
expected continued expansion of FCPA enforcement is likely to be mirrored in a concomitant 
increase in additional collateral litigation.”). 
 54. Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1029 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that a private 
right of action is not available under the FCPA in part because a private right of action “would 
directly contravene the carefully tailored FCPA scheme presently in place”). 
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A. Mechanics of the Demand Requirement 
Requiring plaintiffs to show that demand is futile affords them 
the opportunity to explain why the directors are not equipped to 
handle litigation due to self-interest or incapacity to act in the best 
interests of the corporation.55 After first detailing the contours of this 
requirement, this Section argues that state courts conducting the 
demand-futility inquiry in FCPA cases have confused the two 
Delaware tests for demand futility—(1) board action, or malfeasance, 
and (2) board inaction, or nonfeasance. This confusion has increased 
the burden on shareholders to argue that demand should be excused 
and has led to skepticism about the value of shareholder litigation. 
1. Delaware Demand-Futility Analysis: Alleging Director Interest.  
The demand requirement reinforces the basic premise of corporate 
law that the board of directors is tasked with the management of and 
discretion over the affairs of the corporation. The default rule is that 
the directors manage the corporation’s “business and affairs.”56 Thus, 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1(b)(3)(A) and (B) and Delaware 
Chancery Rule 23.1(a) impose a demand requirement for shareholder 
derivative suits.57 The demand requirement, as “a natural outgrowth” 
of the board’s authority, requires that plaintiffs in derivative suits 
appeal to the board of directors before bringing a suit on the 
corporation’s behalf.58 As compared to shareholder plaintiffs, the 
board of directors is better positioned to respond to the corporation’s 
alleged injury.59 In addition to preserving the board’s authority over 
 
 55. See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 581–82 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (outlining the ways a plaintiff “can show that a director is unable to act objectively with 
respect to pre-suit demand,” including interest in the litigation outcome, close personal 
relationships, and structural bias arising from a director beholden to another); Claire A. Hill & 
Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The Emerging Jurisprudence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 133, 136 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 
2012) (explaining that plaintiffs must “present particularized facts . . . that a majority of the 
board is interested or lacking in independence or else that the board does not deserve the 
protection of the business judgment rule”). 
 56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).  
 57. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3)(A)–(B); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a). 
 58. Andrew C.W. Lund, Rethinking Aronson: Board Authority and Overdelegation, 11 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 703, 703–04 (2009).  
 59. See, e.g., La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 339 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(describing the many resources within the board’s reach including full information of the 
corporation’s business dealings, internal expertise, and the ability to reach a compromise with 
the alleged wrongdoer), rev’d on other grounds, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013). 
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suits, the demand requirement is also intended to filter out groundless 
litigation quickly and efficiently.60 
A plaintiff can only circumvent the board by alleging that 
demand, had it been made, would have been futile, which a plaintiff 
can do only by calling into question the impartiality of the board.61 
The mechanism for excusing demand makes it possible to enforce 
director fiduciary duties in cases in which directors engaged in 
malfeasance.62 A plaintiff’s challenge to a specific decision or action 
by the board is subject to the Aronson v. Lewis63 test, which requires 
particularized allegations that “create a reasonable doubt” that the 
board’s decision should receive business-judgment protection64 and 
that the directors were “disinterested and independent” at the time 
the complaint was filed.65 If the plaintiff does not challenge any 
specific action by the board and instead seeks to establish liability for 
the board’s inaction, courts apply Rales v. Blasband.66 A court 
applying the Rales test asks whether directors could have responded 
to the demand with independent and disinterested business 
judgment.67 
Courts look to the law of the state of incorporation—in many 
cases, Delaware law—to identify the standards for demand futility.68 
 
 60. Jack B. Jacobs, The Vanishing Substance-Procedure Distinction in Contemporary 
Corporate Litigation: An Essay, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007).  
 61. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). The discussion of structural bias as grounds for 
excusing demand is outside the scope of this Note. The interpersonal relationship of directors 
certainly may play a part in demonstrating that the board, as a whole, is unable to consider 
demand objectively, but such issues are more about fact-specific allegations regarding the inner 
dynamic of corporations than about a compliance system that has failed to avert a violation of 
positive law. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 
1040, 1051–52 (Del. 2004); Hill & McDonnell, supra note 55, at 142 (distinguishing the stricter 
standard of review for structural bias from the weaker standard for Caremark oversight claims).  
 62. Lund, supra note 58, at 712.  
 63. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).  
 64. Id. at 808. The business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the 
honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company.” Id. at 812.  
 65. Id. at 814.  
 66. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993). 
 67. Id. at 934. 
 68. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1991); Faith Stevelman, 
Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 57, 66 (2009). In circumstances in which Delaware law does not apply, plaintiffs may 
face a universal demand requirement that is likely to completely foreclose an FCPA follow-on 
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Even if the corporation is incorporated elsewhere, many states follow 
the Rales and Aronson tests.69 These tests for demand futility provide 
an extraordinary remedy in cases in which the board’s impartiality is 
questioned, but the analysis is weighted in favor of the board.70 
Typically, a plaintiff can allege interest under Aronson or Rales 
by pointing to self-dealing by a director who appears on both sides of 
a transaction71 or by showing that a director is interested due to a 
threat of personal liability because a suit by the corporation would be 
detrimental to him.72 Alternatively, a plaintiff may question a 
director’s independence by alleging that a director is dominated by a 
personal relationship or an interested director.73 Claims against a 
specific director’s interest or independence, however, cannot be 
imputed to the rest of the board.74 Pleadings must be particularized to 
individual directors, and to excuse demand, a court must reasonably 
doubt the independence or interest of a majority of the board.75 
2. Confusion Outside Delaware.  This Section gives an example 
of how the demand analyses have been particularly complicated in 
 
derivative suit without making demand on the board. See, e.g., Haw. Structural Ironworkers 
Pension Trust ex rel. Alcoa, Inc. v. Belda, No. 08-0614, 2008 WL 2705548, at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 9, 
2008) (dismissing the FCPA follow-on derivative suit because the plaintiff failed to satisfy the 
“very narrow” irreparable-harm demand exception and could not show threat to standing); 
RALPH C. FERRARA, KEVIN T. ABIKOFF & LAURA LEEDY GANSLER, SHAREHOLDER 
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION: BESIEGING THE BOARD § 6.03 n.3 (2013) (enumerating the 
jurisdictions that have adopted a universal demand requirement to avoid the “inconsistent and 
confusing” demand-required and demand-futility analyses). Other jurisdictions entirely 
foreclose shareholder derivative suits. For example, a pension fund unsuccessfully brought a 
derivative suit against the directors of BAE Systems PLC (BAE) for making bribes to Saudi 
officials. City of Harper Woods Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Olver, 589 F.3d 1292, 1294–95 (D.C. Cir. 
2009). Because BAE was incorporated in the United Kingdom, the old common-law rule of 
Foss v. Harbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 202 (Ch. 1843), dictated that if harm was done to a 
company, the company was the only plaintiff with standing. Olver, 589 F.3d at 1294–95. 
 69. See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 803 (7th Cir. 
2003) (holding that Illinois follows Delaware in using Aronson).  
 70. See In re INFOUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 986 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The 
spirit that clearly animates each test is a Court’s unwillingness to set aside the prerogatives of a 
board of directors unless the derivative plaintiff has shown some reason to doubt that the board 
will exercise its discretion impartially and in good faith.”). 
 71. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 72. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993).  
 73. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002); see also supra note 55 and 
accompanying text.  
 74. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 943 (Del. Ch. 2007) (explaining that there is 
no “universally applicable rule about knowledge imputation”). 
 75. Id. 
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the FCPA context. Because some claims allege both wrongful action 
and inaction by the board, courts must choose between Rales and 
Aronson.76 Whereas the dual pleading may be seen as a sleight of 
hand, the determination of whether Rales or Aronson should apply is 
very fact specific: allegations that the board consciously ignored 
violations fall under Aronson, and allegations that the board failed to 
act, without more, trigger Rales. 
Conflating the Rales and Aronson standards proves particularly 
problematic when courts distort the demand-futility analysis by 
focusing on the wrong board action as the reference point for 
determining whether a director is interested in the challenged actions. 
Specifically, courts have defaulted to framing bribery as an action 
which itself requires director self-dealing. For example, in Strong ex 
rel. Tidewater, Inc. v. Taylor,77 the complaint alleged that directors 
refused to enforce anti-bribery policies,78 but the court could not 
decide whether these allegations constituted inaction under Rales or 
willful inaction under Aronson.79 Foregoing the issue of 
nonenforcement, the court instead focused on whether the directors 
were personally interested in the underlying bribery.80 Because the 
court concluded that the directors were not self-dealing and did not 
receive any personal benefit from the bribes, the directors were found 
to be disinterested and demand was not excused.81 
Here, the court used the wrong decision by the board as its 
reference point. The analysis considered only the underlying act of 
bribery. However, the decision of how to address violations or 
enforce bribery policies goes to the question of director involvement 
not in the crime of bribery but in the cover-up. The court should have 
focused on whether directors decided not to enforce policies or knew 
about violations but did nothing, rather than requiring proof that the 
directors themselves offered bribes or received pecuniary benefit. 
Excusing demand only when a director has made a bribe for his own 
 
 76. See Donald A. Corbett & Daniel K. Roque, FCPA Shareholder Derivative Plaintiffs 
Rack Up Strikes but Keep Swinging, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 18, 2013, at 1, 3 (noting attempts by plaintiffs 
to “frame their claims based on affirmative board conduct, as opposed to a failure to monitor”). 
 77. Strong ex rel. Tidewater, Inc. v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d 433 (E.D. La. 2012). 
 78. Id. at 439.  
 79. Id. at 444. 
 80. Id. at 445.  
 81. Id. 
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benefit obviates the fact that plaintiffs are bringing claims for a 
director’s failure to provide oversight, not for self-dealing.82 
Confusion over the proper application of Rales and Aronson 
arises because the action-or-inaction line is difficult to delineate and 
subject to manipulation in how plaintiffs plead their cases. The main 
problem, however, is ensuring that the court is considering the right 
baseline decision for determining whether a board is interested or 
not. In FCPA cases, as shown above, this decision will likely turn on 
how the company responded to potential violations.83 Only in rare 
cases will it focus on the actual act of bribing a foreign official or 
approving a bribe.84 
B. Pleading Failure To Monitor 
To successfully plead demand futility in oversight cases, a 
plaintiff must allege that a director is interested because it is 
substantially likely that the director violated a duty. As this Section 
explains, there are two levels of pleading in oversight cases. First, the 
plaintiff must allege a Caremark violation, a very high threshold that 
requires a showing that the directors violated their oversight duties 
either through action or inaction.85 The substantive law on directors’ 
oversight duties—upon which all FCPA follow-on derivative suits are 
premised—has evolved from a reconfiguration of the duty of loyalty 
and good faith.86 Second, the plaintiff must show futility arising from 
the directors’ interest and inability to impartially consider a demand 
because it is substantially likely they are liable. To show (1) bad faith 
for the Caremark violation and (2) substantial likelihood of liability 
for demand futility, plaintiffs must allege the directors knew they 
were violating a duty. The intersection of knowledge for the 
Caremark and demand-futility analyses is briefly introduced in this 
Section and fleshed out further in Part III. 
 
 82. See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Strong, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 444; see also Freuler v. Parker, 803 F. Supp. 2d 630, 641 
(S.D. Tex. 2011) (alleging the defendant directors “failed to establish and maintain” FCPA 
controls and “failed to enforce . . . existing policies”), aff’d, No. 12-20260, 2013 WL 1153058 (5th 
Cir. Mar. 11, 2013) (per curiam).  
 84. E.g., La. Mun. Police Em. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CVM-509-JCM, 2013 WL 
431339, at *1 (D. Nev. Feb. 1, 2013).  
 85. See supra Part II.A.1 for the distinct standards for action (Aronson) or inaction (Rales) 
in demand futility.  
 86. Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 457, 464, 470–73 (2009); see also infra note 99. 
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1. Caremark Liability and Demand-Futility Analysis.  A 
Caremark claim stems from a board decision resulting in loss due to 
negligence (action, an Aronson problem) or an “unconsidered failure 
of the board to act” if action would have prevented loss to the 
corporation (inaction, a Rales problem).87 Under Caremark, plaintiffs 
must show (1) a breach of fiduciary duty based on the directors’ 
actual knowledge of legal violations or (2) that directors should have 
known of legal violations and breached their duty of good faith in 
failing “to prevent or remedy [the] situation.”88 Only an “utter failure 
to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system 
exists” establishes the bad faith necessary to find that a director has 
failed to exercise oversight.89 Given this high standard, implementing 
a compliance system is likely sufficient to avoid Caremark liability; 
even if the system is inadequate, liability is unlikely, so long as the 
system is not so grossly inadequate as to implicate a director’s bad 
faith because he knew it was inadequate and failed to monitor it.90 
The intersection between Caremark liability and the demand-
futility analysis requires a close examination of the scenarios that 
would give rise to a claim. Caremark opened the door to director 
liability in the absence of conflicts of interest but still limited liability 
to extreme circumstances of director misconduct.91 Oversight failures 
include scenarios of both action and inaction, for example, (1) a 
director who knowingly violated the law, (2) a director who knew of 
possible violations but took no action, or (3) a director who caused 
the corporation to violate the law to yield greater profits.92 A board 
that has “consciously failed to act” even after receiving evidence of a 
“red flag” alerting the directors they were breaching their duties93 
 
 87. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 88. Id. at 971. In Caremark, shareholders brought a derivative suit against directors alleging 
that they had breached their duty of care by failing to supervise the company’s contracts with 
physicians, which led to federal liability for violation of anti-kickback laws. Id. at 961–64.  
 89. Id. at 971.  
 90. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (en banc) 
(outlining “necessary conditions predicate” to liability as a complete failure to implement a 
system or when there is a system, failure to monitor, and “disabling [the directors] from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention”).  
 91. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS LAW AND PRACTICE 
17–18 (2012).  
 92. Id. 
 93. See La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 341 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(discussing “the proverbial ‘red flag’”), rev’d on other grounds, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. 
Apr. 4, 2013). 
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may straddle (1) and (2). Lack of action, just like a decision to 
outright violate a law, would constitute a board decision subject to 
challenge under Aronson.94 If the board did not act, and Rales applies 
instead, Caremark requires “a sustained or systematic failure . . . to 
exercise oversight.”95 
Caremark expanded director oversight duties while also 
“constrain[ing] courts’ authority to hold directors liable for poor 
compliance decisions.”96 Caremark, in tandem with Stone ex rel. 
AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter,97 requires that directors carry out 
monitoring duties and ensure that a reasonable compliance system is 
in place. The liability for breach, however, only arises when the 
director acted in bad faith by consciously or knowingly failing to 
fulfill the duty concerning compliance and monitoring.98 Stone 
clarified that good-faith violations arising from Caremark oversight 
liability were actually a subset of duty of loyalty claims.99 
2. Bribery and the Duties of Directors.  This Section explains (1) 
how the development of the duty of loyalty in Delaware 
jurisprudence affects the analysis of director duties insofar as bribery 
is concerned and (2) the challenges facing a plaintiff who must plead 
demand futility by relying on allegations of a violation of oversight 
duties. The most obvious violation of the duty of loyalty occurs when 
a director has a conflict of interest or engages in self-dealing.100 But 
the duty of loyalty currently encompasses more than eliminating 
conflicts of interest and an obligation to abstain from self-dealing.101 
 
 94. See id. (“The decision to act [to violate the law] and the conscious decision not to act 
are thus equally subject to review under traditional fiduciary duty principles and equally able to 
create the requisite connection to the board.”).  
 95. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).  
 96. Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ Evolving 
Duty To Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 325 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).  
 97. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (en banc).  
 98. Arlen, supra note 96, at 325–26. 
 99. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70; Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1778. Stone resolved a 
prior disagreement over whether the duty of good faith was a freestanding duty that existed 
separately from the duties of care and loyalty. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good 
Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 12–14 (2006) (outlining then-Vice Chancellor 
Strine’s opposition to the “triadic formulation of duties of corporate managers” in favor of an 
approach in which good faith is part of the duty of loyalty); id. at 15–21 (disagreeing with the 
“dyadic” approach to the duty of good faith based on Delaware precedent and the meaning of 
“faith” as compared to “good faith”). 
 100. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1779. 
 101. Gold, supra note 86, at 488. 
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Professors Hill and McDonnell outline three scenarios aside from the 
traditional self-dealing violation that violate the duty of loyalty: (1) 
when directors defer excessively to each other to the detriment of the 
corporation, (2) when directors act with “suspect motive[s]” in 
following a course of action that benefits them, and (3) when 
directors are themselves involved in violations of positive law or have 
failed to monitor the conduct of other actors who engaged in illegal 
action.102 
The last category, unlike the first two, does not necessarily 
involve a conflict of interest between directors and shareholders.103 
For example, a bribe may facilitate and enhance the corporation’s 
business, and a director who encourages the payment of a bribe may 
do so with the objective of furthering the corporation’s business.104 
This scenario, in which a director engages in outright illegal behavior, 
clearly violates the duty of loyalty notwithstanding the absence of a 
conflict of interest.105 Less clear is whether a director breaches the 
duty of loyalty by failing to monitor corporate practices that may lead 
to bribery.106 
Despite the expansion of the duty of loyalty to non-self-
interested conduct, courts outside of Delaware insist on trying to fit 
the FCPA-related Caremark claims into the traditional self-dealing 
paradigm of loyalty violations. In Strong, the district court dismissed 
the complaint for failure to plead demand futility because the 
 
 102. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1780–81.  
 103. Id. at 1784; see also Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 38 (arguing, prior to the Stone decision, 
that a knowing violation of the law “will seldom violate the duty of loyalty” because the director 
has not acted out of self-interest). 
 104. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1784.  
 105. See id. at 1784–85 (suggesting reasons to equate illegal behavior with a violation of 
loyalty because illegal behavior indicates a propensity for other conduct that may “directly 
diverge[] with the shareholders’ interests or because of a duty owed to the public more generally 
to ensure the corporation is law-abiding”); see also Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 31 (explaining 
the “well established principle” that a director cannot cause a corporation to violate the law 
even if the violation is profit maximizing because any profit is outweighed by the penalty and 
reputational damage).  
 106. See Gold, supra note 86, at 485 (citing Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 38) (“Trying to 
squeeze such conduct into the duty of loyalty is like trying to squeeze the foot of Cinderella’s 
stepsister into Cinderella’s glass slipper—an enterprise equally painful and fruitless.”); Hill & 
McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1785 (“[D]irectors are shirking their responsibility to be vigilant 
when they, on some metric, ‘ought’ to know what their lack of vigilance might permit; hence, the 
violation of the duty of good faith.”); id. at 1780 (arguing that “snoozing,” though superficially 
less serious than “stealing,” may still be problematic depending on the motivation behind 
director’s inattention). 
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directors did not themselves benefit from any bribes.107 The court’s 
analysis failed to recognize that, under a Caremark claim, self-dealing 
is not required for demand futility; instead, demand futility can be 
pled by showing a substantial likelihood of liability for failing to 
oversee the violation.108 A court’s focus on the underlying act of 
bribery would be appropriate when the directors are themselves 
implicated in approving the bribe. Even in that case, however, self-
dealing is not the only road to excusing demand.109 For example, in a 
recent FCPA follow-on derivative suit, the district court decided 
whether directors, who had allegedly approved a bribe to a public 
institution in Macau, were interested.110 The court did not look for 
evidence the directors were self-dealing when they approved the 
bribe, but reasoned that the directors may be interested since they 
may be liable for violating the FCPA.111 
FCPA follow-on derivative suits are thus different from other 
Caremark cases because the underlying facts pertaining to corporate 
bribery are unlikely to hinge on a director’s own self-interest or self-
dealing in a transaction. In other duty of loyalty cases, such as claims 
against the board for backdating stock options for directors and 
officers,112 there are clear grounds on which to allege that directors are 
interested in the challenged transaction. In the bribery context, 
however, a plaintiff is likely unable to show individual directors 
benefitted directly from a bribe to a government official. Whereas in 
the “first wave” of the 1970s, plaintiffs alleged direct participation by 
directors and officers, plaintiffs during the current “second wave” of 
derivative suits allege that directors failed to monitor FCPA risks and 
 
 107. Strong ex rel. Tidewater, Inc. v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d. 433, 445 (E.D. La. 2012).  
 108. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1780; see La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 
46 A.3d 313, 340 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“Without a substantial threat of director liability, a court has 
no reason to doubt the board’s ability to evaluate a demand.”), rev’d on other grounds, No. 380, 
2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013). 
 109. See La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CVM-509-JCM, 2013 WL 
431339, at *5 (D. Nev. Feb. 1, 2013) (employing the substantial likelihood of liability test for 
director interest).  
 110. Id. at *1, *5. 
 111. Id. at *6. Nevada law requires knowledge that a bribe was illegal to excuse demand. 
The court held the plaintiffs had insufficiently alleged that the directors knew the payment was 
illegal and dismissed the complaint. Id. 
 112. See, e.g., Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 909 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Tyson Foods, 
Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 583 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
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compliance.113 These Caremark claims allow plaintiffs to sue directors 
who were not themselves involved in bribery.114 
Demand futility remains a major hurdle, even if the director 
need not be the one receiving or giving a bribe. To overcome this 
procedural hurdle, there must be some other reason why the directors 
cannot disinterestedly respond to the violation and why the plaintiff 
should be allowed to defend the corporation’s interests instead. 
Courts have rejected different bases for questioning directors’ 
motivation. For example, a plaintiff cannot rely on an allegation that 
directors are interested based solely on the fact that they receive 
compensation115 or that compensation motivated them to circumvent 
or refuse to enforce anti-bribery policies.116 Instead, the shareholder 
claim under Caremark must “contend[] that the directors set in 
motion or ‘allowed a situation to develop and continue which exposed 
the corporation to enormous legal liability and that in doing so they 
violated a duty to be active monitors of corporate performance.’”117 It 
is not, however, necessary to demonstrate a “reasonable probability 
of success on the merits.”118 If plaintiffs can show that directors failed 
to monitor and that directors knew they were violating a fiduciary 
duty by “conscious[ly] disregard[ing] their responsibilities,”119 they are 
more likely to demonstrate a failure of oversight and a substantial 
likelihood of liability under the demand-futility analysis for director 
interest. 
Thus, the procedural and substantive aspects of the suit collapse 
into one another because the plaintiff must show a connection 
between the “corporate calamity” and the board that results in a 
“substantial threat of director liability” sufficient to give the court 
pause as to whether the board could disinterestedly evaluate a 
 
 113. Corbett & Roque, supra note 17, at 858. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Group, Inc. Derivative Litig. 700 F. Supp. 2d. 419, 432 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that ordinary compensation is not sufficient to excuse demand and 
that plaintiffs must allege specific facts calling into question the board’s independence based on 
compensation). 
 116. Strong ex rel. Tidewater, Inc. v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d. 433, 445 (E.D. La. 2012). 
 117. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 340 (Del. Ch. 2012) (quoting In 
re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)), rev’d on other 
grounds, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013). For a discussion of Caremark and 
directors’ duty of loyalty, see infra Part III.A.1. 
 118. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993). 
 119. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (en banc).  
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demand.120 Even with the expansion of loyalty and the ability to plead 
demand futility by alleging a substantial likelihood of liability, serious 
challenges remain for plaintiffs who allege director knowledge. As the 
next Part shows, there are cases suggesting that patterns of violations 
or red flags give rise to an inference of knowledge. 
III.  DEMAND EXCUSED: CAREMARK TYPOLOGIES 
The baseline in an FCPA follow-on derivative suit is that 
Caremark pleading poses an extraordinarily difficult burden for 
plaintiffs.121 Courts generally give deference to a board when there is a 
compliance system in place, but this deference is tempered when 
there are suspicious circumstances that suggest board bias due to 
director involvement in the wrongdoing.122 This Part demonstrates 
that there are certain types of cases in which plaintiffs have 
successfully pleaded demand futility. Oversight of violations of 
positive law cases falls in the middle of a spectrum of Caremark cases. 
Self-interest cases present the easiest facts under which to excuse 
demand because there are direct personal benefits.123 In contrast, 
cases featuring a failure to assess business risks pose the hardest facts 
under which to excuse demand because even the worst investments 
are covered by the business judgment rule.124 Oversight of violations 
cases falls in between these two extremes because violations of 
positive law neither give rise to personal benefits nor are sanctioned 
by business judgment. 
Because FCPA follow-on derivative suits do not fit the typical 
duty of loyalty paradigm, Caremark claims arising out of regulatory 
violations provide a better reference point for determining under 
what circumstances courts are willing to allow a derivative suit to 
proceed because a board of directors is interested or otherwise lacks 
 
 120. Id.  
 121. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
 122. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1792 (explaining how there is little structural 
or interest bias in Caremark cases because usually subordinates would have engaged in illegal 
behavior). 
 123. For discussion of cases in which directors backdated stock options, see supra note 112 
and accompanying text.  
 124. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123–24 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(holding that Caremark claims based on directors’ failure to gauge the risk of subprime 
mortgages are not so much about oversight liability as about an attempt to “hold the director 
defendants personally liable for making (or allowing to be made) business decisions that, in 
hindsight, turned out poorly for the Company”).  
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independence. Many of the Caremark cases that have excused 
demand involve healthcare corporations that have violated Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) regulations or Medicare/Medicaid 
reimbursement regulations.125 The healthcare industry, much like 
corporate overseas activities subject to the FCPA, has experienced an 
upward trend in government scrutiny and oversight.126 Another 
interesting feature shared by the healthcare and FCPA Caremark 
cases is the fact that many plaintiffs have resorted to courts outside of 
Delaware. These cases suggest that other state courts outside of 
Delaware are more willing to allow shareholder derivative suits to 
proceed.127 
A. Using Knowledge To Excuse Demand 
Because the standard for director liability is abstract, the 
groupings of Caremark cases are a useful starting point for the very 
fact-specific analysis of Caremark claims in the FCPA context.128 The 
typologies show the factual scenarios that have allowed—and would 
allow—a plaintiff to show that the board of directors has knowledge 
of the violations. The cases excusing demand fall into one or more of 
the following factual scenarios: (1) an extensive paper trail detailing a 
regulatory violation, (2) business strategies that institutionalize a 
regulatory violation and make the business dependent on facilitating 
violations, and (3) objective indicators, such as audit reports and 
oversized profits, coupled with directors’ experience, that give rise to 
an inference that the board knew of a violation. Under these 
scenarios, knowledge serves as the basis for excusing demand because 
 
 125. See infra Part III.A.1–3.  
 126. Kimberly D. Baker & Arissa M. Peterson, Post-Caremark Implications for Health Care 
Organization Boards of Directors, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 387, 387 (2004).  
 127. See Scott J. Davis & Michael T. Torres, Directors’ Monetary Liability for Actions or 
Omissions Not in Good Faith 28 (unpublished manuscript) (May 22, 2009), available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2009/05/directors-monetary-liability-for-actions-or-
omissions-not-in-good-faith.pdf (explaining how two Caremark cases, McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 
808 (6th Cir. 2001) and Abbott Laboratories, a Seventh Circuit case, are indicative of other 
courts’ willingness to allow oversight claims, in contrast to Delaware cases on demand). 
 128. See Stevelman, supra note 68, at 115 (noting how although the fiduciary duties are 
“constan[t]” the true challenge lies in the application of these “fiduciary precepts to changing 
factual scenarios”). Courts have looked to other demand cases to determine which factual 
scenario most closely approximates shareholder allegations against directors for violations of 
the FCPA. See, e.g., Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Deaton, No. H-08-1809, 2009 
WL 6799492, at *7 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009) (“On this record, Plaintiffs’ allegations more closely 
resemble those in Guttman, rather than those in Abbott.”), adopted by Midwestern Teamsters 
Pension Fund v. Baker Hughes Inc., 2010 WL 3359560 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2010). 
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courts can find that continued violations are not protected by the 
business judgment rule (the Aronson test) or find that directors are 
interested because they knew of the violations and thus, face a 
substantial likelihood of liability due to their inaction (the Rales test). 
1. Type One: Extensive Paper Trail and Persistent Violations.  
Courts are reluctant to infer knowledge even when corporations 
repeatedly violate the FCPA, but Type One cases show that reporting 
systems put directors on notice of prior violations—particularly when 
there are repeated violations—and provide an inference that they 
knew of violations that occurred thereafter. 
In In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litigation,129 
the FDA assessed a civil fine against Abbott and ordered it to destroy 
medical inventory that violated federal regulations.130 Before the fine, 
the FDA sent four warnings to company headquarters after 
inspections revealed that products were “adulterated.”131 Abbott 
received warning letters even after it entered an FDA Compliance 
Plan; three years after starting the Compliance Plan and four years 
after the first warnings, the FDA terminated the cooperative 
arrangement, citing Abbott’s repeated violations.132 The plaintiffs 
alleged that Abbott’s directors were aware that the company failed to 
comply for six years.133 
The district court dismissed the case after concluding that the 
alleged facts did not indicate the directors were substantially likely to 
be liable for their inaction under Rales.134 But the Seventh Circuit, 
overturning the district court, disagreed that the directors had merely 
failed to act and decided instead that Aronson was the appropriate 
standard because there was evidence the directors knew about 
Abbott’s violations through the warning letters and audit-committee 
 
 129. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 130. See id. at 798 (finding that Abbott had failed to comply with regulations for 
manufacturing of diagnostic tests kits and regulations protecting human subjects from hazard 
during testing). 
 131. Id. at 799. 
 132. Id. at 800. 
 133. Id. at 802. The plaintiffs pointed to meetings of the board and alleged that they had 
received information about Abbott’s continued noncompliance. Id. 
 134. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 141 F. Supp. 2d 946, 948, 950–51 
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that plaintiffs did not show that the directors knew about the violations, 
and, even if they did know, that their inaction would not show that the directors did not believe 
Abbott was trying to comply with the FDA); see also In re Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 803, 805 
(citing Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993)). 
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meetings.135 The decision to ignore FDA warnings was not protected 
by the business judgment rule.136 Despite the difficulty inherent in 
overcoming the business judgment rule,137 the Abbott plaintiffs 
successfully alleged that the board’s “conscious inaction” amounted 
to a violation of good faith, which was not protected by business 
judgment under Aronson, and which violated Caremark oversight 
duties.138 
To reach the business-judgment issue, the Seventh Circuit first 
inferred director knowledge from the extensive paper trail.139 The 
court interpreted the board’s knowledge and failure to address 
violations as action subject to Aronson rather than inaction subject to 
Rales.140 Unlike the directors in Caremark,141 the Abbott board knew 
about the FDA violations due to multiple warning letters from the 
FDA, meetings with FDA representatives, and newspaper articles 
about possible detriment to Abbott.142 
Abbott is not a case in which a reporting system was completely 
absent or inadequate. Demand futility was based on the fact that 
defendant directors were aware of violations and had received notice 
from the FDA.143 In fact, Abbott indicates that when there is a 
reporting system in place, the court may assume that the reporting 
 
 135. In re Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 806.  
 136. See id. at 809 (“[W]e find that the plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded allegations, if true, 
of a breach of the duty of good faith to reasonably conclude that the directors’ actions fell 
outside the protection of the business judgment rule.”). 
 137. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds 
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (explaining the presumption that “directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company” and that the plaintiff challenging a board 
decision bears the burden of rebutting the presumption).  
 138. In re Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 809.  
 139. See id. (“Given the extensive paper trail in Abbott concerning the violations and the 
inferred awareness of the problems, the facts support a reasonable assumption that there was a 
‘sustained [and] systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight . . . .’” (quoting In re 
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 
No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013))). 
 140. For a discussion on the action versus inaction distinction in Aronson and Rales, see 
supra notes 62–67. 
 141. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.  
 142. In re Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 808. The court also noted that the “magnitude and 
duration of the FDA violations in Abbott were so great that it occasioned the highest fine ever 
imposed by the FDA.” Id. at 809.  
 143. Id. at 806.  
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system worked as intended, and thus, that the board was aware of 
violations and consciously decided not to act.144 
In the FCPA context, by contrast, courts have given defendant 
directors the benefit of the doubt even in the face of persistent 
violations and even—perhaps especially—when there is a compliance 
system. In Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Deaton,145 a 
clear pattern of FCPA violations was present: Baker Hughes 
employees made illegal payments in Brazil and India in 1995 and 
1998, respectively, and the company discovered these payments in 
1999.146 Even after new violations in Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan emerged in 2007, the Texas 
district court dismissed a derivative suit alleging that Baker Hughes 
had failed to provide adequate oversight to avoid payments in 
violation of the FCPA.147 The court concluded that illegal payments 
took place despite the advice of the FCPA adviser and emphasized 
that Baker Hughes had implemented a revised FCPA policy before 
the 2007 violations.148 The Midwestern court distinguished Abbott on 
the basis that the Abbott board failed to take any steps to remedy its 
violations, whereas Baker Hughes made adjustments and addressed 
its persistent corruption issues, even though the changes failed to 
prevent future violations.149 Midwestern diverges from the main thrust 
of Abbott, namely that board knowledge is inferred because 
corporate reporting systems are assumed to work as they should and 
that, based on the violations, the directors did nothing to comply with 
the FDA.150 Instead, the Midwestern court took a different tack: the 
reporting system insulated the Baker Hughes directors from liability 
and was not a basis to infer board knowledge of violations, as in 
Abbott. Moreover, violations after improvements to the reporting 
system happened despite the reporting system and could not suggest 
bad faith or a board failure.151 The Midwestern court did not dwell on 
 
 144. See id. (“Where there is a corporate governance structure in place, we must then 
assume the corporate governance procedures were followed and that the board knew of the 
problems and decided no action was required.” (emphasis added)).  
 145. Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Deaton, No. H-08-1809, 2009 WL 
6799492 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009), adopted by Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. 
Baker Hughes Inc., 2010 WL 3359560 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2010). 
 146. Id. at *2. 
 147. Id. at *3, *11.  
 148. Id. at *2–3.  
 149. Id. at *7. 
 150. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.2d 795, 806 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 151. Midwestern, 2009 WL 6799492, at *8. 
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the fact that for all its revisions, the compliance system still failed in 
several countries, and nor did the court attempt to draw inferences 
against the board or assume that the reporting system would have 
worked as it was intended so that the board would be kept apprised 
of the violations.152 In fact, under Midwestern, corporations can have 
their cake and eat it too. A corporation can point to compliance 
systems to avoid liability for an utter failure of oversight or grossly 
inadequate system.153 At the same time, directors can disclaim 
knowledge of violations because the compliance system was 
inadequate and failed to alert them of subsequent violations.154 
Given the uncertain effect of the reporting system for the 
purposes of the Aronson or Rales tests,155 district courts are likely to 
reach different conclusions regarding which test to apply. The 
Midwestern approach of assuming violations following revisions of 
reporting systems are not actionable gives defendant directors too 
much deference, whereas the Abbott approach of imputing 
knowledge based on an assumption that reporting systems will work 
effectively may go too far in the other direction. The best approach 
would likely consider the case-specific allegations by each derivative 
plaintiff regarding the particular reporting system in place and would 
evaluate the adequacy of the reporting system to determine whether 
the board consciously acted to ignore future violations or had 
implemented rigorous checks that nevertheless failed. 
2. Type Two: Knowledge Based on Overt Business Strategy by the 
Board that Encouraged or Facilitated Violations.  Employing a 
business strategy that is dependent on violating positive law or 
facilitating a violation, if sufficiently overt, is an easier path to 
 
 152. The court did, however, note the shortcomings in the pleadings of the Midwestern 
plaintiffs. See infra note 194.  
 153. See supra notes 89–90.  
 154. Even a reasonably designed compliance system can fail at times. In re Caremark Int’l 
Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, No. 380, 2013 
WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013). But in Midwestern, the government brought complaints against 
Baker Hughes for violations in six countries, after the company was put on notice after the first 
set of violations in 1999 and after the intervening reform of the compliance system between 
1999 and 2007. See supra notes 146–47. 
 155. The issue of whether Rales or Aronson applies remains an open question across 
different district courts and remains unresolved by Delaware courts. See In re Intel Corp. 
Derivative Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d 165, 173 (D. Del. 2009) (outlining the different positions held 
by the Seventh and Third Circuits in applying Delaware law and whether Abbott is a faithful 
application of Delaware law). 
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excusing demand because it suggests that the board itself encouraged 
a violation.156 
In In re SFBC International, Inc., Securities & Derivative 
Litigation,157 the plaintiffs alleged that PharmaNet Development 
Group (PDG) violated FDA requirements for clinical trials by failing 
to disclose medical risks to participants and underreporting negative 
side effects.158 After PDG’s practices became public, shareholders 
sued the board for “failing to correct the widespread mismanagement 
of the company and egregious wrongdoing.”159 The plaintiffs alleged 
PDG’s “strategy for growth and expansion” was based on a violation 
of ethical procedures and falsification of reports.160 The plaintiffs 
pointed to substandard testing at PDG’s largest facility which 
comprised 60 percent of clinical-trial facilities and accounted for 30 
percent of total profits—a sizeable portion of PDG’s operations.161 
Applying Rales, the district court concluded that the directors 
had a “disabling personal interest” and could not exercise 
disinterested and independent judgment because they faced a 
substantial likelihood of liability for PDG’s business practices.162 
Beyond the red flags raised by FDA warnings, the directors knew or 
“should have known” how the corporation conducted clinical trials, 
particularly because misconduct was pervasive and not 
decentralized.163 Their failure to monitor PDG’s “core business” 
amounted to egregious mismanagement of clinical trials and satisfied 
the Caremark requirement of conscious disregard for their duties.164 
The court emphasized that the directors knew of and should be liable 
for the FDA violations because those violations stimulated PDG’s 
business.165 
 
 156. See supra note 105 and accompanying text, which explain how explicit violations of 
positive law always violate the duty of loyalty and give rise to director liability. 
 157. In re SFBC Int’l, Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig., 495 F. Supp. 2d 477 (D.N.J. 2007). 
 158. Id. at 479–80. 
 159. Id. at 481.  
 160. See id. at 480–81 (detailing mammoth clinical-testing operations where it became 
endemic to use uneducated test subjects, to allow human test subjects to participate in 
overlapping trials, and to conceal these violations by using conflicted review boards to oversee 
the clinical trials).  
 161. Id. at 481.  
 162. Id. at 483, 485. 
 163. Id. at 485–86.  
 164. Id. at 486. 
 165. See id. at 485 (concluding that PDG’s “operating procedure . . . enable[d] the company 
to secure and perform contracts for large drug trials”). 
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In addition to which aspects of the business the violation affects, 
the extent of the violations also determines whether a court will 
conclude that the violations have become institutionalized in the 
business strategy of a corporation. If the regulatory violation is an 
isolated event, the board is less likely to be liable for the conduct. But 
if there is a pattern of repeat violations, a board could be implicated 
in supporting, or at least willfully ignoring, the violations.166 In cases 
concerning off-label drug marketing, for example, courts have 
concluded that business practices that make illegal marketing a core 
business priority indicate board participation in violations, 
particularly if there have been violations in the past.167 Moreover, if 
red flags and previous misconduct are pervasive, the need to allege 
particularized knowledge for each defendant may be and has been 
relaxed.168 
Although strategic planning in off-label marketing has given rise 
to inferences of director knowledge, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
has been reluctant to make the same inferences from bribery 
patterns. Commentators point to In re Dow Chemical Co. Derivative 
Litigation169 as foreclosing all shareholder derivative suits from FCPA 
violations.170 Reading Dow this broadly, however, is a mistake. In 
Dow, despite assuming that Dow bribed officials in Kuwait, the court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit because there was no basis to conclude 
the board knew or should have known about the bribe.171 Neither 
previous SEC fines nor bribery incidents in other countries convinced 
 
 166. See id. (finding that the FDA violations at issue were not “merely decentralized activity 
by employees of a far-flung enterprise of the company”). 
 167. In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 453, 461–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
see La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 352, 355–56 (Del. Ch. 2012) (inferring 
knowing approval of violations because the FDA sent warning letters and the company had 
previously settled claims), rev’d on other grounds, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695, at *4 (Del. Apr. 4, 
2013). For a discussion of Pyott’s subsequent history, see infra Part III.B. 
 168. See In re Pfizer, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 462 (determining that it was “entirely reasonable” to 
conclude that each director had “deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]” his duties).  
 169. In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 
2010). 
 170. See Mark, supra note 17, at 481 (“Dow may operate to bar derivative claims based on 
FCPA violations and a Caremark theory.”); cf. Corbett & Roque, supra note 17, at 858–59 
(explaining how Dow fits the paradigm of difficult-to-win Caremark cases).  
 171. In re Dow Chem., 2010 WL 66769, at *13. 
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the Court of Chancery of systematic board involvement in, or board 
knowledge of, the violations.172 
Nevertheless, Dow should not be read as protecting directors 
from liability when there is pervasive, institutionalized bribery. As 
compared to an off-label marketing case in which the plaintiffs could 
point to a slide presentation to the board that listed off-label 
marketing as a top priority,173 the Dow plaintiffs were likely 
unsuccessful in pleading demand futility because they based their 
allegations on public rumors of violations and never inspected 
corporate records. It is likely, then, that if plaintiffs use corporate 
records to show a pattern of bribery, they will fare better than the 
Dow plaintiffs. For example, Siemens’s FCPA violations would likely 
provide some basis for inferring director knowledge from bribery 
patterns. Siemens, the most heavily fined FCPA violator to date,174 
had a culture in which “bribery was tolerated and even rewarded.”175 
Investigations uncovered pervasive violations across the world in 
addition to the institutionalization of bribery practices.176  
This typology would open up the possibility of inferring 
knowledge when a corporation operates in countries or industries 
with high indexes of corruption and when bribes to foreign officials 
are central to the expansion of operations. An important limiting 
principle is necessary, however, as it would go too far for bribery or 
 
 172. See id. (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a prior fine for bribery was grounds for 
knowledge because “similar conduct by different members of management, in a different 
country, in an unrelated transaction . . . is simply too attenuated to support a Caremark claim”).  
 173. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 353 (Del. Ch. 2012), rev’d on 
other grounds, 2013 WL 1264695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013).  
 174. Richard L. Cassin, France’s Total SA Cracks Our Top Ten List, FCPA BLOG (May 29, 
2013 12:38 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/5/29/frances-total-sa-cracks-our-top-10-
list.html. 
 175. Alexandra Wrage & Anne Richardson, Siemens AG—Violations of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 48 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 232, 233 (2009).  
 176. See id. at 232–33 (noting how Siemens had “created elaborate payment schemes” and 
recounting payments in Venezuela, China, Israel, China, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mexico, Iraq, 
Russia, and Vietnam in various different industries, all facilitated by slush funds and off-the-
books records). While the FCPA violations of Siemens lend themselves nicely to the analysis of 
the different Caremark typologies, a derivative suit against Siemens would be unlikely to 
succeed. Siemens, incorporated in Germany, would not be subject to Delaware corporate law; 
rather, under the internal affairs doctrine, German law would determine issues of standing and 
substantive duties of directors in a derivative suit. See DEMOTT, supra note 91, at 223 
(explaining Delaware case law on internal corporate affairs).  
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conditions conducive to bribery to be grounds for per se knowledge.177 
Accordingly, knowledge can be reasonably inferred when there is a 
high risk or incidence of corruption and, despite these risks, the 
corporation has few or inadequate controls. Given the high profile of 
FCPA enforcement and compliance, no corporation could get away 
with having absolutely no internal controls;178 the next logical step for 
ensuring compliance is scrutiny over the adequacy of systems when 
there are known bribery risks. 
3. Type Three: Inferring Knowledge from Prior Experience of the 
Directors or Objective Factors.  Though courts often defer to the 
decisions of experienced boards, directors’ previous experience with 
violations may speak to their ability to address recurring violations.179 
In McCall v. Scott,180 the plaintiffs alleged pervasive violations of 
Medicare and Medicaid laws in patient treatment and cost 
reporting.181 The Sixth Circuit analyzed demand futility under Rales.182 
The court concluded that demand was futile because the pleadings 
created doubt that the directors were disinterested.183 There were two 
discernible bases for liability: (1) the directors’ prior experience and 
(2) other objective indicators. 
First, the directors had previously served on the corporation’s 
board and as members of the compensation and audit committees; 
many red flags, coupled with the board’s inaction, suggested 
recklessness or conscious disregard by the board.184 The court 
determined that Caremark liability did not require intentional or even 
reckless infliction of harm on the corporation, and therefore, even 
unintentional inaction could suffice.185 Though the allegations did not 
support a finding of “corporate-wide wrongdoing,” they did suggest 
 
 177. A “bad outcome” cannot be equated with “bad faith” and a violation of a director’s 
duties. King ex rel. Cephalon Inc. v. Baldino, 409 Fed. App’x 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2010); Stone ex 
rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006) (en banc). 
 178. See, e.g., SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 751–52 (N.D. Ga. 1973) 
(“No organization, no matter how small, should ignore the provisions of the FCPA 
completely.”); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
 179. Baker & Peterson, supra note 126, at 393.  
 180. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 181. Id. at 814. 
 182. See id. at 816 (finding that the board’s failure to respond to systematic fraud was not 
“tantamount to a conscious decision to refrain from acting”).  
 183. Id. at 819.  
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. at 814.  
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directors were aware of improper acquisition practices by the 
corporation.186 Objective indicators, including audit information, a qui 
tam action, press reporting, and billing increases, also suggested that 
directors knew of the corporate misconduct.187 Taken together, these 
factors were enough for the court to excuse demand based on the 
substantial likelihood of director liability.188 
4. Expanding Inferences of Director Knowledge.  The three types 
of cases presented above are factual scenarios in which plaintiffs have 
successfully alleged violations of Caremark duties. Given that many 
FCPA cases have been foiled by the need for plaintiffs to allege 
director knowledge to show a violation in bad faith and to give rise to 
substantial liability, these typologies could provide a basis for 
expanding a board’s liability. In some circumstances, it will 
nevertheless be difficult to infer that the board knew that violations 
occurred, particularly if the violations involve isolated occurrences of 
third parties paying bribes in foreign countries. 
Accordingly, when FCPA violations are persistent rather than 
isolated events or when they form part of business strategy more 
generally, courts should be more willing to infer knowledge. Courts 
outside of Delaware, at least, seem particularly generous in inferring 
director knowledge based on a violation’s severity. But even 
Delaware courts have inferred director knowledge in shareholder 
derivative suits.189 In American International Group, Inc. v. 
Greenberg,190 the directors were directly in control of the operations in 
which fraud occurred.191 In FCPA cases, however, directors generally 
would not have been in direct control of the overseas operations 
where FCPA violations are more likely to occur.192 Nevertheless, 
 
 186. Id. at 819, 821–22.  
 187. Id. at 821.  
 188. Id. at 824.  
 189. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763, 799 (Del. Ch. 2009) (holding, on a 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, that the plaintiffs stated a breach of loyalty claim against defendant 
directors for “knowingly tolerating inadequate internal controls and knowingly failing to 
monitor their subordinate’s compliance with legal duties”). AIG is very similar to Type Two. 
See supra Part III.A.2. 
 190. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763, 799 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 191. Id. at 777 (drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs and determining that 
“misconduct was not isolated; it permeated AIG’s way of doing business” so that it was 
reasonable to infer that the defendant directors knew of fraudulent schemes).  
 192. See Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the 
Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. LEG. 425, 478 (2009) 
(arguing against the focus on directors in anticompliance efforts and explaining how compliance 
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changing the baseline of the misconduct from actual bribery to the 
neglect of high-level compliance programs could be one way of 
bringing the control into directors’ hands. In FCPA cases, courts have 
not been quite as generous in inferring knowledge from objective 
indicators. Inferring knowledge based on the risk of corruption in a 
country where a company has operations, without more, would likely 
go too far.193 Inferring knowledge when there is specific information 
that directors knew about violations and decided not to investigate, 
however, would come well within the existing bases for Caremark 
liability. 
B. Procedural Strategies for Pleading Demand 
This Section analyzes the practical problems in shareholder 
derivative litigation that would afflict FCPA follow-on litigants, even 
if courts employ relaxed standards for inferring director knowledge. 
1. Mitigating Conclusory Pleading: Books and Records.  This 
Section shows that the success of any claim, mentioned above, will be 
contingent on the successful completion of a books and records 
inspection. It is difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs to survive a 
motion to dismiss and make sufficiently particularized allegations 
based on public information alone.194 If plaintiffs continue to neglect 
the opportunity to organize and inspect books and records, one way 
 
depends on low-level employees who are the first line of defense against bribery). However, the 
duty of loyalty of directors does not exempt them from overseeing foreign operations. Cf. In re 
Puda Coal, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6476-CS, at 17–18 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/files/2013/02/puda-case.pdf (underscoring the need for U.S. 
directors’ oversight over foreign operations where a foreign director stole corporate assets). 
 193. Cf. Strong ex rel. Tidewater, Inc. v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d. 433, 450 (E.D. La. 2012) 
(concluding that the high risk of certain overseas locations, like Nigeria and Azerbaijan, does 
not give rise to an inference the board of directors knew about possible corruption or that they 
intentionally failed to act). 
 194. See Freuler v. Parker, 803 F. Supp. 2d 630, 651 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (outlining deficiencies 
in pleadings including failure to identify auditing reports and how each director should have 
known the company was violating internal controls), aff’d, No. 12-20260, 2013 WL 1153058 (5th 
Cir. Mar. 11, 2013) (per curiam); Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Deaton, No. H-
08-1809, 2009 WL 6799492 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009), at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009) (“Plaintiffs’ 
conclusory allegations leave one free to imagine either that Baker Hughes had the most 
comprehensive compliance program in the industry, or the most deficient.”), adopted by 
Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Baker Hughes Inc., 2010 WL 3359560 (S.D. Tex. 
May 26, 2009). 
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or another, the Delaware Court of Chancery will force them to do 
so.195 
Pleading demand futility imposes an extraordinarily difficult 
burden for Caremark plaintiffs.196 As previously discussed, the most 
difficult aspect of the pleadings is alleging knowledge by directors.197 
Public information is unlikely sufficient to allege knowledge. The 
existence of a DOJ investigation, for example, is insufficient to allege 
that the corporation’s directors are substantially likely to be liable 
because they knew of the violation.198 In the absence of investigative 
reporting, information about FCPA violations or related board 
deliberations is generally not publicly available for plaintiffs seeking 
to formulate complaints.199 
In Delaware, however, a shareholder may make a written 
demand to inspect the corporation’s books and records under Section 
220 of the Delaware Code.200 Section 220 requests are closely tied to 
heightened pleading requirements for derivative suits, specifically for 
Caremark pleading: “[o]nly the extremely rare complaint will be able 
to establish” a link between a corporation’s legal violation and the 
board without the benefit of “internal corporate documents.”201 
Despite repeated admonitions, the docket of derivative shareholder 
actions has been plagued by first (or “fast”) filers, who do not inspect 
records.202 
 
 195. See Corbett & Roque, supra note 76, at 3 (noting the evident effects of Delaware’s 
preference for books and records requests on litigants: plaintiffs in the Avon and Motorola 
shareholder derivative suits initiated Section 220 actions prior to filing, and defendant Wal-Mart 
“voluntarily produced board minutes, agendas, and its FCPA policies”).  
 196. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 197. For a discussion of strategies for inferring knowledge when plaintiffs cannot point to 
outright director involvement, see supra Part III.A.  
 198. Saginaw Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No.5:10-CV-4720-EJD, 
2012 WL 967063, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012). 
 199. See Michael J. Borden, The Role of Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance, 12 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 311, 345–46 (2007) (explaining how in Caremark cases plaintiffs 
often rely on investigative reports to draft complaints in derivative suits and as a starting point 
for later stages of a case following an unsuccessful motion to dismiss and attributing this reliance 
to the “lack of access to discovery”). 
 200. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2011).  
 201. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 342 (Del. Ch. 2012), rev’d on 
other grounds, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013); see id. at 342–43 (explaining the 
dismissal of “a steady stream of Caremark claims” because plaintiffs did not request inspection). 
 202. Stevelman, supra note 68, at 111. Delaware increasingly favors the “better” complaint. 
Id. 
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The Delaware Court of Chancery attempted to create a fast-filer 
presumption against plaintiffs who did not make Section 220 demands 
prior to filing complaints.203 Vice Chancellor Laster criticized “fast-
filing” plaintiffs and lawyers who treat the derivative suit as a lottery 
by filing suits without any previous inspection of records or 
investigation “in the hope that one will hit.”204 In Louisana Municipal 
Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Pyott,205 unsuccessful plaintiffs 
in California district court206 “who fail[ed] to conduct a meaningful 
investigation” prior to filing and failed to plead demand futility were 
held to be inadequate plaintiffs for collateral estoppel purposes.207 
Therefore, plaintiffs who later sued in Delaware were not precluded 
from bringing a second suit.208 The Delaware Supreme Court, on 
interlocutory appeal, reversed the application of this presumption in 
determining the adequacy of the plaintiffs.209 This reversal has also 
been read as preventing the Court of Chancery from using the 
Section 220 demand as a prerequisite in the demand-futility 
analysis.210 However, the notion that complaints without Section 220 
demands are insufficient for demand-futility pleadings in Caremark 
cases existed before Pyott.211 The Court of Chancery’s presumption 
just attempted to formalize it: rather than dismissing cases based on 
conclusory pleadings, the court attempted to apply the presumption 
against the first plaintiffs in line who did not inspect records. 
 
 203. Pyott, 46 A.3d at 335–36. For other cases applying the presumption, see South v. Baker, 
No. 7294-VCL, 2012 WL 4372538, at *16–18 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 2012) (applying the presumption 
to dismiss a complaint); Baca v. Insight Enterprises, No. 5105-VCL, 2010 WL 2219715, at *5 
(Del. Ch. June 3, 2010) (same); King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 994 A.2d 354, 364 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 12 A.3d 1140 (Del. 2011). 
 204. Pyott, 46 A.3d at 344.  
 205. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313 (Del. Ch. 2012), rev’d, No. 380, 
2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013). 
 206. See In re Allergan, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. SACV 10–1352 DOC, 2012 WL 
137457, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012). 
 207. Pyott, 46 A.3d at 350. 
 208. Id. at 351. 
 209. Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695, at *4 (Del. Feb. 5, 
2013); see also infra Part III.B.2. 
 210. See Francis Pileggi, Supreme Court Reverses Chancery on Collateral Estoppel/Demand 
Futility and Section 220 Issue, DEL. CORP. & LITIG. BLOG (Apr. 8, 2013), 
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2013/04/articles/delaware-supreme-court-updates/supreme-
court-reverses-chancery-on-collateral-estoppeldemand-futility-issue (noting that Pyott likely 
“diminishes the impact” of other decisions questioning the adequacy of plaintiffs who had not 
filed Section 220 demand before alleging demand futility).  
 211. See Pyott, 46 A.3d at 343, nn.22–23 (enumerating the many times plaintiff’s cases were 
dismissed for failing to use Section 220 proceedings). 
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Effectively, the presumption would have added another step to the 
shareholder derivative suit.212 
Even without the presumption, plaintiffs—who already face a 
difficult pleading burden under Caremark—do themselves a 
disservice by skipping the Section 220 demand, particularly in FCPA 
follow-on derivative suits. In fact, criticism for failing to make a 
Section 220 demand underlies the dismissal of FCPA follow-on 
derivative suits. In Dow, the Court of Chancery’s only FCPA case 
thus far, the plaintiff’s failure to inspect books and records was 
detrimental to claims questioning the directors’ independence.213 
Thus, plaintiffs alleging deficiency in FCPA compliance programs 
would similarly benefit from making a Section 220 demand.214 
2. The Problem of Multijurisdictional Litigation.  This Section 
explains the phenomenon of multijurisdictional litigation (MJL) 
arising from the fast-filing problem discussed above. Because most 
jurisdictions allow the first filed complaint to move forward, litigants 
across the country rush to the courthouse to bring the same claims 
against a corporation. In addition to facing the possibility of dismissal 
for failing to request books, litigants also face the possibility of being 
beaten by a faster plaintiff who will then control the litigation.215 The 
main loci in MJL are typically the state of incorporation and the 
principal place of business.216 MJL disadvantages defendants who are 
forced to litigate in multiple jurisdictions217 and who then respond 
 
 212. See Jacobs, supra note 60, at 5–6 (2007) (detailing the “unforeseen consequence” of 
Aronson’s pleading requirements was the outgrowth of different motions, including demand 
excused motions, class certification to circumvent the demand requirement, and Section 220 
proceedings to inspect books and records for particularized futility pleading).  
 213. See In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *9 n.50 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010) (reprimanding plaintiffs for failing to use Section 220 to “flesh out their 
unparticularized allegations of a ‘clubby’ inner circle on the Dow board” and saying that “[h]ad 
they done so . . . their allegations might have met the requirements of Rule 23.1”).  
 214. Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Deaton, No. H-08-1809, 2009 WL 
6799492, at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009) (finding that the plaintiffs did not offer more than 
speculation about the implementation of policies and procedures and “leave one free to imagine 
either that Baker Hughes has the most comprehensive compliance program in the industry, or 
the most deficient”), adopted by Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Baker Hughes 
Inc., 2010 WL 3359560 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2010).  
 215. Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who Caused 
This Problem and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 13 (2012). In contrast to the federal 
panel on multidistrict litigation, there is no “unified system for handling [MJL] on a national 
scale.” Id. at 4 n.12. 
 216. Id. at 5. 
 217. Id. at 7. 
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with a motion to stay the proceedings in order to litigate in only one 
forum. To resolve this problem, a court may issue a stay in favor of 
another jurisdiction when there are concurrent claims. There is no 
guarantee, however, that courts will always be so deferential.218 The 
issue of how to handle simultaneous, parallel derivative suits remains 
unresolved, particularly because there is no presumption to disqualify 
whichever plaintiff failed to file a request to inspect books and 
records.219 
The problem of MJL is simplified, however, when a jurisdiction 
has already decided one of the suits, given that collateral estoppel 
would preclude subsequent shareholders from alleging the same 
injury and grounds for demand futility. The resolution of a collateral-
estoppel issue in an FCPA follow-on derivative suit is relatively 
straightforward. In Holt v. Golden,220 plaintiffs filed suit against Smith 
& Wesson’s directors and officers under Caremark for “failing to 
have effective FCPA controls and oversight.”221 The suit in Holt was 
filed in federal district court in Massachusetts, and the defendants 
moved to dismiss for failure to make demand and because a state 
court had previously dismissed a derivative suit on the grounds that 
demand was not futile.222 The district court held that the state court’s 
prior dismissal barred a second derivative suit.223 The state court’s 
judgment was preclusive because (1) the core issue was the same—the 
board’s ability to resolve demand—and (2) the board’s interest was 
the same in 2008 and in 2011 because the board composition was the 
same.224 
The district court’s analysis indicated that so long as the second 
complaint pleads demand futility with reference to the same or nearly 
the same composition of the board, then a prior court’s demand-
futility analysis precludes reconsideration.225 It does not matter that 
later plaintiffs allege different facts that could excuse demand if those 
 
 218. See Stevelman, supra note 68, at 108–11 (detailing how Delaware is increasingly 
reluctant to cede jurisdiction when there is another complaint pending in a different state 
court). 
 219. Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys., No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695, at *3–4 (Del. Apr. 
4, 2013). 
 220. Holt v. Golden, 880 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 221. Id. at 201. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See id. at 202 (finding that the state court concluded there was no reasonable doubt a 
majority of the board was disinterested and independent). 
 224. Id. at 203.  
 225. Id.  
JARA IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  8:43 AM 
2013] FCPA FOLLOW-ON DERIVATIVE SUITS 235 
facts were previously available.226 This approach is consistent with the 
outcome in the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Pyott. 
Reasoning that full faith and credit required the Court of Chancery to 
accept the California district court’s dismissal of the derivative suit 
against Allergan for violations of off-label marketing laws,227 the 
Supreme Court precluded the later Delaware plaintiffs from bringing 
suit after California had dismissed a similar suit.228 Although the 
Court of Chancery’s analysis of demand futility is a useful data point 
for determining what sets of facts excuse demand,229 dismissal of the 
first suit in California rendered moot any future plaintiff actions. 
Under current law, collateral estoppel remains the operative doctrine 
when one jurisdiction has already rendered a final judgment. 
Pyott eroded the latest attempt by the Court of Chancery to 
employ “strong-arm tactics to force forum” or to claim “unique 
competence to interpret and apply Delaware’s corporate law.”230 The 
Delaware Supreme Court still recognized the challenge of fast filing 
and MJL.231 Moreover, the Court of Chancery is increasingly acting as 
a preemptive gatekeeper of derivative suits by dismissing cases that 
fail to conform to the “idealized” shareholder action.232 Even with 
formal case management presumptions removed from its toolbox, the 
Court of Chancery is taking a more proactive role in shepherding 
plaintiffs through the necessary steps. For example, in the Wal-Mart 
cases, the Court of Chancery refused to appoint a lead plaintiff out of 
the seven plaintiffs with pending suits in Delaware. Instead, the court 
 
 226. See, e.g., In re Sonus Networks, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., 499 F.3d 47, 63 (1st Cir. 
2007) (giving preclusive effect under Massachusetts law to the first derivative suit and denying 
later derivative plaintiffs the opportunity to rely on facts alleged in a second complaint because 
those facts were available at the time of the first suit).  
 227. Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys., No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695, at *2 (Del. Apr. 4, 
2013). 
 228. Id. at *4. 
 229. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 230. Stevelman, supra note 68, at 64. 
 231. Pyott, 2013 WL 1364695, at *4.  
 232. See La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 344–46 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(describing the “idealized” shareholder action as one where “dispersed stockholders could act 
collectively following a corporate trauma . . . . They would not file suit hastily . . . [and the] 
stockholder collective would recognize there is no need to rush. . . . Rather than filing hastily, 
the hypothetical stockholder collective would proceed deliberately. . . . [I]t would conduct an 
investigation and seek books and records . . . . [I]f the books and records showed director 
misconduct, then stockholders could decide to pursue a claim . . . [and] the costly process of 
briefing and arguing motions to dismiss would take place at once”), rev’d on other grounds, 2013 
WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013). 
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appointed three co-lead plaintiffs and ordered a consolidated 
complaint, but only after a Section 220 action.233 
IV.  THE VALUE OF FOLLOW-ON DERIVATIVE LITIGATION TO 
COMPLIANCE EFFORTS 
Given the criticisms levied against shareholder derivative suits in 
the aftermath of FCPA violations and scandals,234 this Part attempts to 
provide a more nuanced view of what value plaintiffs add to the 
compliance efforts of a corporation, even when their claims are 
unlikely to succeed. First, there is the effect of articulating standards 
which carry only a minuscule chance of liability but can still affect 
how corporations internally structure compliance systems and how 
directors regard their oversight duties. After all, Caremark duties, 
propounded by the Court of Chancery in dicta, “became the leading 
standard of review for claims alleging breach of a board’s oversight 
obligations.”235 Second, even outside of the typology of cases that 
could proceed beyond demand-futility stages, there is intrinsic value 
to cases that have been settled by plaintiffs concerned with 
encouraging robust compliance measures. This Part ends with a 
description of which plaintiffs and cases lead to the best litigation and 
settlement outcomes. 
A. Value of Demand Futility Litigation 
Whether derivative suits based on Caremark claims actually 
deter violations by the corporation remains an open question in 
corporate law.236 There may be some deterrent effect because 
procedurally, shareholder derivative suits can be very burdensome for 
a corporation that faces suits by multiple plaintiffs across different 
jurisdictions. Moreover, if plaintiffs begin to heed the Court of 
Chancery’s frequent admonitions, directors are likely to face more 
Section 220 motions from plaintiffs who genuinely want to hold 
boards accountable for violations. 
 
 233. Order Regarding Case Management at *6–7, In re Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Derivative 
Litig., Nos. 7455-CS, 7470-CS, 7477-CS, 7489-CS, 7490-CS, 7612-CS, 7630-CS (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 
2012). 
 234. See supra note 19 and accompanying text and infra note 240 and accompanying text.  
 235. Stephen Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 
974 (2009). 
 236. See Kenneth B. Davis Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. REV. 387, 433 
(2008) (indicating that the threat of derivative suits plays a role in deterring major violations 
and, if such suits are brought, defendant directors seek to settle them quickly). 
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Defining the contours of unacceptable board responses to FCPA 
violations, though unlikely to lead to outright liability, may still 
encourage new perceptions of acceptable behavior by directors.237 In 
considering demand-futility cases, courts have an opportunity to give 
greater teeth to the compliance and oversight duties of directors, 
particularly as they relate to violations of positive federal law.238 
Moreover, opinions on the sufficiency of pleadings and the 
boundaries of substantial likelihood of liability to excuse demand are 
some of the only precedents that mark the boundaries of director 
oversight duties. Although Caremark liability is a remote possibility, 
follow-on derivative suits enable courts to prescribe how directors 
interact with compliance systems and what role, if any, they should 
exercise beyond merely establishing these systems. 
B. Value of Shareholder Complaints 
Despite the heavy burdens of demand-futility pleading, plaintiffs 
have not been deterred in the FCPA context or perhaps in Caremark 
cases generally. In FCPA follow-on derivative suits against 
corporations with a history of violations similar to Wal-Mart or 
Siemens, plaintiffs could marshal sufficient facts to make a strong 
showing of at least one of the Caremark typologies. This would 
require alleging a pattern of violations that were internally regulated 
and formed part of a business strategy across countries. A better case 
is one in which directors tacitly or explicitly sanctioned bribes to 
facilitate business. The unsuccessful cases are those in which bribes 
were isolated events or were carried out by third parties without the 
knowledge of corporate management.239 
 
 237. See Gold, supra note 86, at 515–16, 520–21 (suggesting that although the expansion of 
the duty of loyalty does not lead to liability, directors’ perceptions of loyalty may nevertheless 
change and alter their behavior by facilitating opposition on the basis of loyalty to actions that 
are in a grey area of loyalty); Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 1794, 1796 (explaining the 
normative function of Caremark in encouraging desirable behavior in directors and the “rush to 
abide” by Caremark and in encouraging courts to use good faith as a “‘bully pulpit’”). 
 238. Davis, supra note 236, at 437 (explaining that demand requirement cases remain 
important precedents that define the liability of directors, even when demand is not actually 
excused). 
 239. Under the FCPA, the doctrine of respondeat superior extends liability to corporations 
even for the actions of rogue employees because they are considered agents of the corporation. 
COMM. ON INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, THE FCPA AND ITS IMPACT ON 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 4 (2011), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/
pdf/report/uploads. 
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1. Corporate Governance Initiatives.  The Caremark typologies 
analysis for excusing demand based on director knowledge does not 
address cases in which corruption mechanisms are decentralized. 
Follow-on derivative litigation may seem “parasitic,” motivated only 
by attorneys’ fees, or unnecessary in light of government 
enforcement.240 As FCPA shareholder settlements show, however, 
even when plaintiffs file claims that will fail to excuse demand, they 
are still motivated to influence corporate governance and behavior. 
Corporate governance reform, rather than pure financial recovery, is 
a major feature of FCPA follow-on derivative-suit settlements.241 In 
fact, settlements in FCPA follow-on derivative suits have not yielded 
high monetary sums—certainly no sum that approximates DOJ or 
SEC settlements.242 Although one could speculate that the lack of 
outright financial recovery is a sign the suits were meritless, FCPA 
follow-on derivative plaintiffs have negotiated considerable reforms, 
exceeding typical corporate reforms in other types of derivative 
suits.243 Moreover, these corporate reforms may represent a different 
type of financial value, namely the long-term reduction in corporate 
costs associated with FCPA violations. 
 
/FCPAImpactonInternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf. Although FCPA civil and criminal 
liability is perhaps exceedingly broad, this Note acknowledges that civil liability for directors 
arising from the actions of rogue agents would likely add little to overall compliance efforts. 
 240. For a perspective on the parasitic nature of follow-on derivative suits, see supra note 19 
and accompanying text; see also Can We Sue Our Way to Prosperity?: Litigation’s Effect on 
America’s Global Competitiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 40 (2011) (statement of John H. Beisner, U.S. Chamber 
Inst. for Legal Reform) (criticizing FCPA derivative suits for “piggyback[ing]” onto government 
investigations and being motivated only by the “deep pockets” of company insurers). 
 241. See Lucinda Low, Sean Griffin & Shannon MacMichael, What Sets SciClone’s FCPA 
Derivative Suit Apart, STEPTOE (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-
pdf.html/pdf/?item_id=7897 (noting that unlike most FCPA collateral litigation in which the 
main objective is the collection of fees—fees that are sometimes much greater than government 
penalties—the SciClone settlement was focused on compliance initiatives).  
 242. Compare Brown et al., supra note 15 (reprint at 1) (noting high settlements in follow-
on litigation generally, but specifically referencing securities shareholder class actions in which 
settlements “exceeded by large margins any fines the accused company paid to the government” 
including $15.5 million when the government settlement was $500,000), with FCPA Autumn 
Review 2012, MILLER CHEVALIER (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.millerchevalier.com/Publications/
MillerChevalierPublications?find=89901 (noting that no settlement has resulted in a major 
financial award, with attorneys’ fees ranging between $2.5 million and $10 million).  
 243. See, e.g., In re Johnson & Johnson Derivative Litig., 900 F. Supp. 2d 467, 488 (D.N.J. 
2012) (determining that corporate reforms were “more substantial and tailored” than typical 
corporate reforms that are no more than “window dressing cloaking what amounts to nothing 
more than a strike suit designed to line the pockets of greed-stricken counsel”).  
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In a settlement between Johnson & Johnson and plaintiffs who 
filed suit after FDA and FCPA violations came to light, the plaintiffs 
alleged a breach of fiduciary duties. The corporation moved to 
dismiss but the parties entered into settlement negotiations before the 
court ruled on the motion.244 The federal district court in New Jersey 
that approved the settlement noted that the creation of an oversight 
committee of independent directors rectified the corporation’s 
shortcomings by creating “company-wide control and assurance 
systems that are designed to effectively supplement J&J’s 
decentralized management approach.”245 Whereas this 
“decentraliz[ation]”246 would likely have spelled doom for plaintiffs 
trying to show specific director involvement in business strategy that 
included bribes, the settlement negotiations provided plaintiffs a 
means of influencing corporate governance without the burdens of 
demand pleading. Moreover, the court found that the corporate 
reforms “confer[red] a substantial benefit” on the defendant 
corporation.247 
For SciClone and Halliburton, corporate reforms were designed 
to address future FCPA risks.248 The SciClone settlement stipulated 
very specific corporate reforms—such as the creation of a 
“compliance coordinator” who is fluent in Mandarin and English—
indicating that the parties likely tailored the agreement to the specific 
risks SciClone faced in FCPA compliance.249 Moreover, the 
agreement also stipulated the chain of reporting from the compliance 
 
 244. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at 6, In re Johnson & Johnson, 900 F. Supp. 
2d 467 (No. 11-2511), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/200406/
000020040612000115/a201207168-kexhibit992stip.htm. 
 245. In re Johnson & Johnson, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 473. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 487.  
 248. See e.g., Stipulation of Settlement at 15–16, In re SciClone Pharm., Inc. S’holder 
Derivative Litig., No. CIV 499030 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2010) [hereinafter “SciClone 
Stipulation of Settlement”] (requiring the corporation to undertake due diligence prior to hiring 
third-party agents abroad as well as to conduct periodic due-diligence inquiries and to 
competitively compensate agents with fixed salaries to avoid corruption and commissions), 
available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/SCLN/1444862867x0x508025/6f6c3478-e777-
4893-9044-b3e3f7f51616/Stipulation_of_Settlement.pdf; Stipulation of Settlement at 20–21, 
Policemen & Firemen Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. Cornelison, No. 2009-29987 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 9, 
2012) [hereinafter “Halliburton Stipulation of Settlement”] (modifying the code of business 
conduct to require due diligence prior to hiring consultants abroad and requiring enhanced 
FCPA training for employees in “high-risk countries”), available at 
http://www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/press_release/2012/policemen_firemen_cause
no2009_29987.pdf.  
 249. SciClone Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 248, at 9. 
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coordinator to the audit committee, as well as the frequency of 
meetings and the board review of anticorruption policies.250 The 
specificity of this provision scrutinizes the adequacy of the 
compliance program; a court likely would not engage in such scrutiny 
in its demand-futility analysis due to the force of the business 
judgment rule.251 Still, a requirement that the board of directors 
promptly consider voluntary disclosure to the SEC or DOJ in the 
event of future violations suggests that the plaintiff shareholders 
acknowledge the primary role of government enforcement in FCPA 
compliance.252 At the same time, shareholders may also be able to 
pressure corporations by reprimanding individual directors and 
officers.253 
2. Predicting Success.  Features of follow-on derivative suits may 
be predictive of the corporate governance-oriented goals of derivative 
plaintiffs and the added value of shareholder derivative suits to 
general compliance. For example, institutional investors as plaintiffs 
and the consolidation of cases may predict a settlement that includes 
corporate governance reforms.254 These predictive factors should not 
be surprising. Multiple complaints may be expected when violations 
are particularly egregious. Moreover, institutional investors are 
generally considered more activist than other investors and more 
 
 250. Id.  
 251. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(“Obviously the level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system is a question 
of business judgment.”), rev’d on other grounds, No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013). 
 252. SciClone Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 248, at 12–13; see also Halliburton 
Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 248, at 2 (shielding directors from liability if they disclosed 
violations to the government and cooperated with the investigation).  
 253. See SciClone Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 248, at 17 (requiring the board to 
consider implementing a policy that would clawback all the compensation earned by an officer 
during the period of misstating bribes as corporate expenses); Halliburton Stipulation of 
Settlement, supra note 248, at 1–2 (stipulating that the bonuses and compensation of directors 
will be revoked if the director participated or directly supervised an individual responsible for 
the bribery, as determined by disinterested directors of a separate committee). It is interesting 
that the clawback positions represent different levels of liability risk for directors, with 
accounting misstatements leaving directors more vulnerable to liability than direct supervision.  
 254. In the three settlements agreed to by Johnson & Johnson, Halliburton, and SciClone, 
respectively, multiple cases were consolidated and at least one case had been brought by an 
institutional investor. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 244, at 3–4; SciClone 
Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 248, at 1; Halliburton Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 
248, at 1–2. 
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interested in corporate-governance issues.255 Activist institutional 
investors should to some extent be motivated by the substantial size 
of their investment.256 Institutional investors should therefore be 
interested in ensuring compliance for the sake of preserving the value 
of their investment and avoiding the hefty fines and drops in stock 
prices that come with FCPA government enforcement. Quite 
ingeniously, FCPA compliance provides an opportunity for 
institutional investors to play a greater role in the management of 
corporations. A growing focus on compliance and oversight duties 
may lead to greater institutional investor involvement in what 
typically would have been board-exclusive matters. 
Substantively, complaints with facts that do not raise business 
risk allegations are more likely to result in successful settlement 
negotiations.257 FCPA cases came of age in the era of mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) litigation. The convergence in time of FCPA 
and MBS litigation is partly to blame for the myopic view of 
Caremark duties for directors in the FCPA context. Because MBS 
cases raise paradigmatic concerns about the business judgment of 
directors, Caremark cases are generally viewed with skepticism, even 
when in the case of FCPA follow-on derivative suits there may be 
egregious failures in oversight duties. MBS and business risk do not 
lend themselves to easy compliance systems and thus are problematic 
in a Caremark analysis for oversight failures.258 
But the outcomes of MBS cases like In re Citigroup Inc. 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation259 should not be generalized to 
Caremark cases based on violations of positive law. With the FCPA, 
 
 255. See Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (2008) (noting the 
prominent role institutional investors play in corporate governance, including bringing 
shareholder proposals, serving as lead plaintiffs, and influencing shareholder votes).  
 256. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: 
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions To Participate 
in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 416–17 (2005) (noting that 
securities reform efforts have attempted to “harness[] the economic self-interest” of 
institutional investors with large holdings). Despite reform efforts, empirical evidence shows 
institutional investors have a “dismal record” in bringing suits in the securities class action 
context. Id. at 425. 
 257. See Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 988 (arguing that complaints regarding “red flags 
involving illegal behavior” are more likely to succeed as compared to risk-management 
failures).  
 258. Id. at 982.  
 259. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). For a 
description of the case’s holding, see supra note 124. 
JARA IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  8:43 AM 
242 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:199 
there are compliance requirements, and the obligations of directors 
are more easily defined within the parameters of what the law 
requires. For example, a plaintiff may succeed in challenging the 
compliance system because it fails to account for vulnerabilities in 
countries where corruption is particularly prevalent. The same 
plaintiff, however, would be unsuccessful in alleging a breach of 
fiduciary duty based on the board’s decision to do business in a 
corruption-ridden country. A plaintiff may challenge the compliance 
system and the director’s response to violations of the FCPA, but 
collateral attacks against the legitimate business choice underlying the 
violation would likely destroy Caremark pleading or, alternatively, 
prospects of a favorable settlement. 
Thus, the foregoing discussion outlines the characteristics in 
derivative suits that would be determinative in how a court gauges a 
plaintiff’s pleadings and would accordingly lend leverage to plaintiffs 
in settlement negotiations.260 With the Court of Chancery closely 
managing the Wal-Mart case proceedings—proceedings that closely 
approximate the “idealized”261 suit—perhaps the unsuccessful trend of 
follow-on derivative suits in the FCPA context will finally end. 
Excusing demand would be a significant, though not impossible, 
departure from Delaware courts’ stance on shareholder derivative 
suits. More likely, a settlement between the plaintiffs and Wal-Mart 
will include compliance reforms and greater input from institutional 
plaintiffs.262 
CONCLUSION 
As levels and targets of government enforcement of the FCPA 
evolve, private plaintiffs will continue attempts to establish bases for 
director liability to account for the losses to corporations from 
settlements and disgorgements. The lack of successful follow-on 
derivative suits can be attributed to plaintiffs’ failure to account for 
 
 260. The predictive features of success add gloss to the “idealized” shareholder suit 
described by the Delaware Court of Chancery. See Part IV.B.2; see also La. Mun. Police Emps. 
Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 338, 344 (Del. Ch. 2012) (explaining the “idealized” shareholder 
derivative suit which includes collective shareholder action and resourceful plaintiffs), rev’d on 
other grounds, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013).  
 261. Pyott, 46 A.3d at 338. 
 262. See Low et al., supra note 241 (noting how recent settlements including corporate-
compliance reforms “create[] significant rigidity in what has been a dynamic area [of compliance 
obligations], and put[] shareholders at the table in establishing controls that heretofore have 
been the province of management and the board of directors”).  
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the procedural burdens of the derivative suit. Delaware precedent 
and the decisions of other courts, however, indicate that demand 
could be excused based on director knowledge of FCPA violations in 
at least a subset of cases. Because demand-futility cases provide an 
avenue for understanding the substantive duties of directors, these 
cases are particularly important for deepening a corporation’s 
understanding of FCPA violations and liability. Moreover, even if few 
cases will actually excuse demand, the complaints by shareholders 
who are well-organized and interested in corporate governance add 
to the general framework of FCPA compliance. Settlements by FCPA 
derivative plaintiffs are notable because they target the specific 
company deficiencies in compliance and give shareholders greater 
input. Indeed, the FCPA follow-on derivative suit is both changing 
our conceptions of director liability for FCPA violations and 
revealing new insights into the role and value of derivative suits in the 
process. 
